Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy and Managerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United States by Zakson, Laurence S.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 8
Number 1 Fall 1984 Article 4
1-1-1984
Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy and
Managerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Sweden and the United States
Laurence S. Zakson
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laurence S. Zakson, Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy and Managerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden
and the United States, 8 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 93 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol8/iss1/4
Worker Participation: Industrial
Democracy and Managerial Prerogative
in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Sweden and the United States
By LAURENCE S. ZAKON
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCION
In light of the recent economic difficulties and consequent disloca-
tion of employees experienced by United States industry, the concern of
American workers with having a voice in corporate or industrial affairs
has expanded from an interest in wages, hours, seniority and other tradi-
tional areas to include interests in job security and corporate and mana-
gerial decisions affecting closing and relocation of facilities, layoffs and
other matters covering the whole of the working environment.1 Despite
manifestations of such concern, however, many unions have found the
1. Two recent incidents illustrate this interest. The first is the case of First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), in which the amicus curiae brief filed by
the AFL-CIO and the United Auto Workers (UAW) referred to the fact that "[t]he AFL-CIO
and the UAW are vitally interested" in which subjects fall within the scope of required bar-
gaining and, in particular, in "the problem of plant closings and economic dislocation." Ami-
cus Curiae Brief, AFL-CIO, UAW at ii, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666 (1981). The brief also sets out the degree to which the UAW and Chrysler Corporation
had been successful in bargaining about such traditionally managerial decisions. Id. at ii-iiL
The second incident is the recent ratification of the 1982 Ford-UAW agreement which grew
out of negotiations between the UAW and Ford Motor Co. in 1979. The agreement provides
for a broad pilot program of employee involvement. This effort, which entails an ongoing
process of worker input, is referred to by the UAW-Ford National Joint Committee on Em-
ploye [sic] Involvement as "encouragement to all employes [sic] to become involved in and to
personally contribute to: their jobs, group efforts, quality products, . . . improvements in the
working environment, and to the success of the Union and the Company." Letter 3 from the
UAW-Ford National Joint Committee on Employe [sic] Involvement to Ford Motor Co. Plant
Industrial Relations Managers, Presidents, Building Chairmen, and Recording Secretaries of
all Ford Local Unions in the U.S. (Sept. 19, 1980) (available on request from Vice President
for Labor Relations, Ford Motor Co.). See also BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SU.MMiARY
REPORT FOR 1982: LAYOFFS, PLANT CLOSINGS AND CONCESSION BARGAINING 3 (1983);
INSTITrE OF GOVERNMENT STUDIES, UNIVERSrrY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIFOR-
NIA DATA BRIEF 1 (Sept. 1983) (citing EMPLOYMENT DATA & RESEARCH DIVISION, CALI-
FORNiA EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT CLOSED BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA:
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search for participation by workers in work environment decisions to be
unsuccessful. In one recent and typical National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) case,2 a plant closing decision by a major United States corpora-
tion-a decision which would have the effect of devastating the local
economy-was determined by the NLRB to be beyond the reach of "the
code of laws in our nation."3 This determination effectively prohibited
legal industrial action by the workers to safeguard their jobs or their
community.
In contrast, most modem West European countries have systematic
worker participation plans that recognize and provide for participation
by workers and their unions in a broad range of managerial and corpo-
rate decisions.4 While such plans are referred to by such diverse names
as codetermination, joint regulation, industrial democracy and worker
participation,5 their goal is essentially the same: to provide workers with
a greater voice in the direction and vital decisions of the enterprise for
and in which they work.6 The Commission of the European Communi-
ties has described the underlying rationale of such participation mecha-
nisms as follows:
[I]ncreasing recognition [is] being given to the democratic imperative
that those who will be substantially affected by decisions made by so-
cial and political institutions must be involved in the making of those
decisions. Employees not only derive their income from enterprises
which employ them, but they devote a large proportion of their daily
lives to the enterprise. Decisions taken by or in the enterprise can have
a substantial effect on their economic circumstances, . [and] their
health and physical condition .... 7
FEBRUARY 1980-MAY 1983 (June 10, 1983)); Note, Advantages and Limitations of Current
Employee Ownership Acts to Workers Facing a Plant Closure, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 93 n.2 (1984).
2. United Steelworkers of America Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 103
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2925 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
3. Id. at 2932.
4. Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands all employ such schemes. J. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM 1
(1977). The European Economic Community also has a uniform worker participation propo-
sal for member states. Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the Structure of Socidtds Anonym es,
BULL. OF THE EUR. COMM., Supp., at 8-9 (Oct. 1972).
5. For a discussion of several of these terms and their use, see H. JAIN, WORKER PAR-
TICIPATION SUCCESS AND PROBLEMS 3-20 (1980); S. PEJOviCH, THE CODETERMINATION
MOVEMENT IN THE WEST vii (1978); J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 1.
6. See, eg., SWEDISH INSTITUTE, FACT SHEETS ON SWEDEN, LABOR RELATIONS IN
SWEDEN 3-4 (Feb. 1983); Meissel & Fogel, Codetermination in Germany: Labor's Participa-
tion in Management, 9 INT'L LAW. 182 (1975) (quoting Inaugural Address by H. Schmidt,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (May 17, 1974)).
7. Employee Participation and Company Structure in the European Community, BULL.
OF THE EUR. COMM., Supp., at 9 (Aug. 1975) quoted in S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 4.
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As a result, many European workers not only "are helping to decide such
mundane matters as coffee-break provisions, they are also... [deciding]
such major matters as approving or rejecting big capital spending
projects." s
This Note will examine some of the historical, political and legal
forces underlying the concepts of industrial democracy, worker partici-
pation and managerial prerogative in two Western European nations,
Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the United States.
It will examine the mechanics of worker participation systems in each of
these nations, discuss their "transferability" and apply these mechanisms
to a hypothetical situation. Ultimately, it will argue that the accommo-
dation of the conflicting interests arrived at by the European nations can
be used as a model of accommodation of worker participation interests
and owner prerogatives to achieve a more expansive scope for mandatory
collective bargaining within the United States collective bargaining
arena.
II. NATIONS SELECTED FOR COMPARISON
A. The United States
In the United States, efforts to afford workers the opportunity to
participate in decisions affecting worker interests may face significant dif-
ficulties. In a recent decision interpreting the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA),9 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 10 the United
States Supreme Court restricted the scope of mandatory bargaining" so
as to make collective bargaining agreements regarding such decisions as
plant closings and, perhaps, relocations, more difficult for unions and
workers to secure. This case indicates that many of the "core" manage-
rial decisions having broad implications for workers and their job secur-
ity, the same decisions in which workers and their unions have been
expressing a desire to participate, may be excluded from the scope of
mandatory bargaining. One of the primary arguments for limiting the
scope of mandatory bargaining is based on the concept of "managerial
prerogative." 2 This limitation has the effect of making agreements on
such subjects, for all practical purposes, entirely dependent on the em-
8. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 1.
9. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C § 151-69 (1982).
10. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
11. Mandatory bargaining is, inter alia, that type of collective bargaining for which work-
ers may use economic sanctions to induce negotiations. See infra text accompanying notes 28-
34.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32-48.
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ployer's desire to discuss the subject, rather than on the ability of the
parties to introduce the topic through the use of economic forces.13
B. Sweden
Sweden was chosen as a nation for comparison in this Note because,
like the United States, the Swedish system puts a great emphasis on col-
lective bargaining agents and agreements in its labor relations law.14 In
addition, "Sweden is considered to have the most far-reaching program
of worker participation in Europe."15
In general, the Swedish system of worker participation, Medbestam-
mande,16 is designed to provide for full equality between labor and man-
agement in decision-making, but Medbestammande legislation does not
specify how this equality is to be accomplished. "Instead, it broadly pro-
vides that individual companies and their unions must collectively nego-
tiate rules with respect to all policies which have a bearing upon working
conditions." 17 It is of particular import to note here, however, that de-
spite an affirmative duty to bargain imposed on the parties by this legisla-
tion, and despite the breadth of the scope of bargaining topics and the
unprecedented quantum of information sharing required of the company
by the Medbestammande Acts, the 1976 Act "reaffirm[ed] the employer
prerogative to direct"18 in the workplace. The employer, therefore, has
lost some of its unfettered discretion to make decisions, but retains, sub-
ject to its own agreement to relinquish, the ultimate power to direct the
enterprise.1
9
C. The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany was selected as a nation for com-
13. But cf. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of the Collective Bargaining by the National Rela-
tions Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 391 (1950) (seemingly arguing that unions will, through
section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charges, seek to force management to discuss matters they
lack the "economic power" to force it to discuss).
14. See generally Sigeman, The Structure of Swedish Collective Labour Law, an Introduc.
tion, in 1 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY: AN ANGLO-SWEDISH COMPARATIVE STUDY 132-
42 (1982).
15. Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking
Directorate?, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 263 (1977).
16. This is the Swedish word for codetermination.
17. Steuer, supra note 15, at 263 (footnote omitted).
18. Fahlbeck, The Swedish Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life, in 1 LAW AND
THE WEAKER PARTY: AN ANGLO-SWEDISH COMPARATIVE STUDY 156 (1982).
19. Cf., Anderman, Labour Law in Sweden: A Comment, in 1 LAW AND THE WEAKER
PARTY: AN ANGLO-SWEDISH COMPARATIVE STUDY 200 (1982) ('[T]here are undoubtedly
severe limitations to those positive rights created by Swedish legislation.").
[Vol. 8
Industrial Democracy in W. Germany, Sweden & U.S.
parison in this Note primarily because of its long history of codetermina-
tion efforts.2" It was also selected because of two immediately obvious
differences from the United States. First, the labor movement in the
Federal Republic is unified, highly centralized at the federal level and has
a unifying ideology.21 In contrast, in the United States, the union local
and the individual plant are much more important. Second, while em-
ployees are represented by two bodies in the Federal Republic,2 the
union and the works council,' 3 workers in the United States are repre-
sented by a majority union which serves as the exclusive bargaining agent
for the employees.24
Comparing United States and West German labor relations law in
this context is helpful because of the fact that the ideological struggle and
the underlying tension of demands for economic democracy and worker
participation on the one hand, and the more classical liberal economic
view with its emphasis on managerial prerogative as an incident of pri-
vate ownership on the other hand, has been more openly and clearly ar-
ticulated within the West German context than in other nations. A final
reason for looking at West Germany is the fact that two of the key meth-
ods of implementing industrial democracy' have been developed and are
maintained in that nation by entirely different means. Works councils
are virtually universal as a worker participation mechanism in the Fed-
eral Republic because they are required by statute, 6 whereas collective
bargaining agreements are so comprehensive largely because employers
have chosen to make them so.27
20. See, eg., S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 58-9; J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 5.
21. Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S and West Germany: A Comparative Study
from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 370 (1980).
22. For a discussion of bifurcation of worker representatives in Germany see infra text
accompanying notes 213-22.
23. Summers, supra note 21, at 373. Cf. . FURLONG, supra note 4, at 5-6. Works coun-
c's in Germany and Sweden are not identical, but are, in some ways similar. Both are plant-
level bodies in which issues of interest to labor are discussed. Both are technically and, to a
large degree, practically independent of the unions.
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
25. The third key method, labor participation on the supervisory board, is not as univer-
sal; therefore it is not considered at this juncture.
26. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BErRVG] I, 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB 1] I [hereinafter
BetrVG 1972].
27. Summers, supra note 21, at 378. This is despite the fact that in Germany, as in the
United States, less than 40% of all employees are union members. As to Germany, see Sum-
mers, supra note 21, at 379. As to the United States, see Summers, Industrial Democracy:
America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29, 36 n.47 (1979).
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III. THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. The Mandatory/Permissive Dichotomy
In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,28 the United
States Supreme Court held that sections 8(a)(5)29 and 8(d) 30 of the
NLRA establish a mandatory duty for the employer and the collective
bargaining agent of the employees to "bargain with each other in good
faith with respect to 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment . . . .'" This duty is "limited to those subjects [set-out in
section 8(d)], and within that area neither party is legally obligated to
yield. As to other matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not
and to agree or not . ,31 Thus, Borg- Warner and cases follow-
ing it have established a "mandatory-nonmandatory" or "mandatory-
permissive" dichotomy of subjects in the collective bargaining arena.3 2 If
28. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
29. Section 8(a) states that: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-.
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
30. Section 8(d). For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract,
unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination of modification... ;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiat-
ing a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days
after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies
any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes...
and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all
the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such
notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later. ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
31. 356 U.S. at 349. It is important to note here that the duty to bargain is not the same
as a duty to agree. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99 (1970).
32. See generally, D. LESLIE, LABOR LAW 203-09 (1979).
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a subject is labeled mandatory, any party may insist on bargaining over it
until an impasse is reached and neither party may legally refuse to dis-
cuss it.33 If a subject is labeled permissive, neither party may insist upon
discussing it nor force the other party to consider it. In addition, a find-
ing that a subject is not mandatory means that if a party refuses to dis-
cuss the matter, the other party may not bring any economic pressure
(e.g., a strike by the labor side or a lock-out on the employer side) to
coerce the party which has refused to bargain into bargaining over or
agreeing to the matter. The determination that a subject is permissive,
therefore, has the consequence of taking such a subject outside the collec-
tive bargaining arena unless the parties voluntarily decide to discuss it.'
Therefore, if unions seek to pursue worker participation as a collective
bargaining goal, the attachment of the label "mandatory" or "permis-
sive" to the subject matter of such efforts will have a marked effect on
how successful their pursuit will be.
B. The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 35 the United States
Supreme Court began a process of setting out the test for whether a bar-
gaining subject was mandatory or permissive. The issue in that case was
whether contracting out part of the employer's work was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The employer sought to contract out, without bar-
gaining, maintenance work that had to be done on the employers' prem-
ises, which had previously been done by the employer's employees. The
decision to contract out was made in an attempt to save labor costs be-
cause the subcontractor's employees were paid less than bargaining unit
employees. After the work was contracted out, the employer took the
position that he had no further use for the maintenance employees and
that negotiation of a new bargaining agreement for those employees
would be pointless. The words of the NLRA at issue there were "terms
and conditions of employment." The Court found it relatively easy to
decide that the instant case fell within the literal words of the Act since
the contracting out involved work on the employer's premises and neces-
sarily caused termination of the affected employees.
33. Atleson, Managerial Prerogatives Plant Closings; and the NLRA, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L
& Soc. CHANGE 83, 88 (1983). Cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (discussing the
duty of bargaining and good faith). Cf also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
34. For a general discussion of the practical meaning of this distinction, see Atleson, supra
note 33, at 89.
35. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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The Court in Fibreboard spelled out what was in application, if not
in name, an embryonic balancing test.36 The purposes of the NLRA and
the advantages of bringing the controversy over a "vital concern" of "la-
bor and management within the framework established by Congress as
most conducive to industrial peace" 37 (the interests in having the dispute
settled through collective bargaining) was to be balanced against the
"propriety" of requiring the employer to bargain about a matter which
would "significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business."'38 De-
spite broad language in the opinion for the Court, the Court narrowly
confined its holding that the subject was appropriate to the situation at
hand. Justice Stewart's concurrence, which has become at least as well-
known as the opinion of the Court, implied that the Court was unwilling
to interpret the "terms and conditions of employment" much more ex-
pansively than it did in Fibreboard:
Many decisions made by management affect the job security of em-
ployees. Decisions concerning the volume and kind of advertising ex-
penditures ... may bear upon the security of the workers' jobs. Yet it
is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve "conditions of em-
ployment" that they must be negotiated with the employees' bargain-
ing representative.
N .. othing the Court holds today should be understood as
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial de-
cisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.39
In 1965, about one year after Fibreboard, the United States Supreme
Court in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.40 held that "so
far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the abso-
36. The opinion for the Court does not deal with the issue as if it were a balancing. None-
theless, in the First Nat'l Maintenance decision, the Court relies heavily on Fibreboard and,
seemingly, interprets the test advocated by Fibreboard as one of balancing. In addition, in at
least one decision immediately subsequent to the Fibreboard case, a court of appeals responded
to the decision as if it understood the Fibreboard approach as such. NLRB v. Royal Plating
and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). The preeminence of the concurrence and its
emphasis on reconciling the conflicting demands of managerial rights on the one hand and the
purposes of the NLRA on the other yields this conclusion as well. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at
218-19. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1965) (measuring the
limits of the duty under sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) by infringement on freedom of managerial
decision-making).
37. 379 U.S. at 211. For a discussion of the centrality to the Act of the idea of collective
bargaining, and of its role as the Congressionally determined mechanism most conductive to
labor peace, see 29 U.S.C. § 151 and cases and articles cited in 1 C. MORRis, THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW 553-58 (2d ed. 1983).
38. 379 U.S. at 213.
39. Id. at 233 (Stewart, J., concurring).
40. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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lute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, but
. . . [not] to close part of a business no matter what the reason."4
When taken together, the Fibreboard opinion, the Stewart concur-
rence and Darlington illustrate a concept which commentators have re-
ferred to as "managerial prerogative.142 This concept rests on the notion
that the employer is the source of all managerial powers and that all
those powers not ceded in the collective bargaining agreement are re-
tained by the employer. It refers to a sphere of decisions which are the
sole or exclusive province of the management/owners of the enterprise
and over which the Court is unwilling to say that the NLRA compels
good faith bargaining.
C. First National Maintenance and Employer Prerogatives in
Decision Making
The modem judicial view of the limits of the scope of mandatory
bargaining and how competing interests are to be accommodated was
expressed in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.43 In that case,
the employer was in the business of providing housekeeping/mainte-
nance for commercial customers, one of which was a nursing home. As a
result of a dispute between the employer and the customer, the employer
terminated the service agreement with the customer. The newly certified
union, upon learning of the termination of the agreement and the pend-
ing termination of the employees involved, sought to bargain with the
employer about the decision. When management refused, the union filed
an unfair bargaining practice charge against the employer alleging a vio-
lation of the duty to bargain in good faith under sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA. 4 In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun spelled out
the test for determining whether requiring an employer to negotiate with
the certified representative of its employees over a decision to close part
of its business falls within the scope of mandatory bargaining under sec-
tions 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The implicit balancing of
Fibreboard is made explicit in the First National Maintenance decision.
The Court held that while Congress did not explicitly state "what issues
41. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
42. See, ag., Atleson, supra note 33, at 95. See also National Lead Co., 43 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1025, 1027-28 (1964). For two relatively clear expressions of the concept in a legal
context (although neither has any value as precedent), see Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Order of
R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 330 (1960), dealing with
the Railway Labor Act, 45 US.C. § 151-64; and Amicus Curiae Brief, U.S. Chamber of Com-
mercepassim, First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
43. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
44. Id. at 670.
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of mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude from
mandatory bargaining,"45 such a determination should be made "in view
of an employer's need for unencumbered decision making."'46 It then
stated that "bargaining over management decisions that have a substan-
tial impact on the continued availability of employment should be re-
quired only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the
collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the con-
duct of the business."'4 7 Finding that the "decision to halt work at this
specific location represented a significant change in petitioner's opera-
tions,"48 the Court held the employer had no duty to bargain with the
employee's representative about its decision and that the decision itself
was not part of section 8(d)'s "terms and conditions of employment"
over which Congress mandated negotiations. 49 In brief, the test as it was
applied in First National Maintenance boils down to a balancing test
which weighs the burden of requiring negotiation on the interests of
management against the benefits to "industrial peace" and to collective
bargaining as a method of channeling industrial conflict. This test does
not explicitly deal with the decision's effects on employees.
IV. A REVIEW OF THE WORKER PARTICIPATION
MECHANISMS IN SWEDEN
A. Legislation
Since the late 1960's5" the Swedish labor relations environment has
undergone significant change in response to trade union demands for "in-
45. Id. at 679.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 688.
49. Id.
50. Different authors have disagreed on the actual date. See, SWEDISH INSTITUTE, supra
note 6, at 1. Compare, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 92-3 with F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 14 (.1977). Prior to 1970, however, "there was very little labor
legislation" and the labor relations environment was governed by the Basic Agreement be-
tween the Swedish Employers' Confederation, Svenska Arbetsgivarefdreningen, (SAF) and the
Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions, Landsorganisationen iSverige, (LO) and the few early
decisions of the labor court. (The LO is not the only Swedish trade-union, but it is the union
of the "manual laborers.") S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 85. For the text to the Basic Agree-
ment, see Basic Agreement (available upon request from the Swedish Consulate). As to the
labor court, see Sigeman, supra note 14, at 132; ef L. FORSEBACK, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND EMPLOYMENT IN SWEDEN 39-40 (1980).
For a more specific but less directed analysis of current Swedish participation mecha-
nisms, see Summers, Worker Participation in Sweden and the United States: Some Compar-
sonsfrom an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 175 (1984).
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dustrial" and "economic democracy.""1 The Basic Agreement and the
Agreement Regarding Works Councils5" provided Swedish workers with
a voice in their work environment through collective bargaining agree-
ments and worker-employer consultative bodies.53 Nonetheless the un-
ions felt that adequate information about, 4 and effective influence over,
workplace decisions could be expected only by creating worker participa-
tion mechanisms in which unions could more fully participate 5 and in
which real decision-making powers were vested.5 6 In response, the So-
cial Democratic government passed legislation between 1973 and 1977
setting out a new structure for Swedish collective labor law.57
The Medbestammande mechanisms in Sweden consist of several
pieces of legislation, the center5" of which are the Act on the Joint Regu-
51. Se4 eg., F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 14; L. FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 39-40.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 134-53 (in regard to German works councils); me
also F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 115 n.26 (on composition of Swedish works councils). For
a brief comparison of Swedish and West German works councils, see id. at 80 n.2.
53. Works councils had "come into being" by 1946 in an agreement between the SAF and
LO, F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 79. The TCO (another Swedish labor organization) later
joined in a revised agreement in the mid-1960's. Id.; L. FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 38-9.
54. See, F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 115.
55. See, id. at 79-80, 115-16. Cf. S. PEJOViCH, supra note 5, at 110-11 (discussing the
increased union role under the new Act). For a more general discussion of such participation,
see Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 152-53 (discussing, generally, union representation of
employees).
56. See, e-g., F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 80-81.
57. Eg., Bills on worker representation on boards of Stock Companies, SFS 1976:351 and
SFS 1972:829, see also L. FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 52; Amendments to the Industrial
Safety Act, SFS 1977:1160; the 1974 Act on the Position of the Trade Union Representative,
SFS 1974:358, amended by SFS 1975:356, SFS 1976:594, see F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at
81-82; the 1974 Employment Protection Act, SFS 1974:12, see Sigeman, supra note 14, at 133;
and the Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life, SFS 1976:580, see Sigeman, supra note
14, at 133. See also P. AHLSTROM, Co-DETERMINATION AT WoRKI THE ALMEX EXPERI-
ENCE (Working Life in Sweden No. 17, March 1980).
58. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 93. Among the other pieces of legislation (not discussed
herein for the purpose of brevity) in the codetermination area are: the Work Environment
Act (dealing with occupational safety and health), SFS 1977:1160, amended by SFS 1980:245,
ADA 1980:428, SFS 1982:674, see generally SWEDISH INSTItUTE, FACT SHEETS ON SWE-
DEN, OCCUPATIONAL SAETY AND HEALTH IN SWEDEN (Jan. 1982); the 1974 Act on Litiga-
tion in Labor Disputes, SOU 1974:8, Bill 1974:77, see F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 39; the
1974 Act on the Trade Union Representative's Position at the Workplace, SFS 1974:358,
amended by SPS 1975:356, SFA 1976:594, SFS 1982:87, ILO LEGISLATIVE SETUrEs 1974-Swe-
den, 3, see Sigeman, supra note 14, at 133-42; and, perhaps, the most important of the
Medbestammande legislation other than the Joint Regulation Act and the Act on Board Rep-
resentation for Employees, the Ansta K. Kninyskyddslag, SFS 1982:80. This replaced SFS
1974:12, the statute referred to in the literature about Swedish labor law. It does not change
the "for cause" requirement or the Employment Protection Act, which virtually abolished the
employer right to dismiss employees at will. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 150. Cf. SWEDISH
INsTrrUTE, supra note 6, at 4 (an employee may only be diicharged for cause).
19841
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
lation of Working Life5 9 (Joint Regulation Act) and the Act on Board
Representation for Employees in Limite.d Companies and Co-operative
Associations' (Board Representation Act). These two statutes are
designed "to give workers a bigger voice in company decision-making." 6
1. Board Representation Act
The representation of Swedish workers on the board of directors of
Swedish corporations is, generally speaking,62 minority and primarily in-
formational.63 "The unions appear satisfied with the minority represen-
tation assigned to them under the law and look to the . . . co-
determination act to provide significant gains in participation."" There-
fore, the Board Representation Act is really viewed as a "complement"65
to the Joint Regulation Act.
Generally, under the Board Representation Act the employees of a
company employing twenty-five or more persons enjoy the right to ap-
point two members and two deputy members66 to the board of directors
of that company. This is the case even if the board consists only of two
shareholder-nominated members. Where the company board consists of
only one shareholder-nominated member, however, the employees are
entitled to appoint only one wage-earner member and one deputy mem-
ber. When the board is equally divided the chairperson has a deciding
vote.67 The statute assumes that the chairperson is appointed by the
59. SFS 1976:580 [hereinafter cited as Joint Regulation Act]. The English translation is
reprinted in F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN app. 1, at 234-246
(1977) [translation hereinafter cited as F. SCHMIDT Translation].
60. SFS 1976:351, amended by SFS 1980:236, SFS 1980:111 [hereinafter cited as Board
Representation Act], which replaced a temporary measure of the same name, SFS 1972:829.
The English translation is reprinted in 3 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY: AN ANGLO-SWED-
ISH COMPARATIVE STUDY 145-49 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP.
STUDY].
61. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 93. See also F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 85.
62. The exceptional situation where owners have one director and workers have one di-
rector does not disturb the owner majority since the statute assumes that the owner representa-
tive director, as chair, can break any tie vote. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
63. See section 1 of the Act itself: "The purpose of this Act is to afford to employees in
joint stock companies and cooperative associations, by representation the board, insight and
influence in respect of the activity of the enterprise." [emphasis added]. Board Representation
Act § 1, ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP. STUDY, supra note 60, at 145. Cf. L. FORSEBACK, Supra
note 50, at 52 (discussing the Act); J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 96-7 (discussing the aims of
the Act).
64. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 96.
65. Id.
66. Board Representation Act § 5(1), ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP. STUDY, supra note 60, at
146.
67. S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 108.
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shareholders at the annual general meeting.6
At least fifty percent of the employees of the company must be
union members before the law becomes applicable. 69 The unions may
either agree on the distribution of board seats among themselves or com-
ply with a statutory allocation of seats. Normally, however, employee
representatives are nominated by the largest labor confederation repre-
sented in the enterprise. Once the representatives have been appointed
they may remain in office even if the number of employees falls below
twenty-five, the statutory minimum to get initial board representation.
As a general rule, employee representatives should be appointed from the
employees of the concern. 0 After the decision to provide employees
with representation on the board has been reached by the local trade
union,"' the "board of the enterprise shall be informed in writing."' 7
The employee representatives, as well as the deputy members, 73 have the
right to attend and speak at board meetings.74 The regular worker repre-
sentative member (as opposed to deputy members) has, in addition, all
rights of a shareholder-nominated member subject to section 17 of the
Act."1 In addition, to prevent working or control committees from car-
rying on the actual business of the board without the benefit of worker
participation, the Board Representation Act entities at least one em-
ployee representative to sit on "specially appointed" board committees.76
68. Id.
69. See Board Representation Act § 10(1), ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP. STUDY, supra note
60, at 147. This requirement not only is different than that of the Act on Joint Regulation, but
is even different than the Act on the Union Representative's Position at the Workplace (which,
like the Act of Board Representation of Employees discussed here, requires a union initiative
to come into effect). Id. §§ 12.2-12.3 at 147.
70. See S. PEjOVICH, supra note 5, at 108; Board Representation Act § 6, ANGLo-S wED-
ISH COMP. STUDY, supra note 60, at 146.
71. The statute provides for such decisions to "be taken by a local trade union which is
bound by a collective agreement in relation to the enterprise... or by several such trade
unions. . . ." Id. § 10(1) at 147.
72. Id. § 10(3) at 147. Recall, the local union must decide whether to bring the Act's
provisions into operation. Id. § 10(1) at 147.
73. These usually are members of the minority union.
74. Board Representation Act § 15(l), ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP. STUDY, supra note 60, at
148.
75. "An employee member shall not be permitted to take part in the activity of the board
... concerning
1. negotiations with trade unions;
2. . . . notice to terminate a collective agreement; or
3. industrial action." Id. § 17 at 148.
76. Id. § 16(1) at 148.
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2. Joint Regulation Act
Perhaps the single most important piece of legislation in the
Medbestammande area is the Joint Regulation Act.77 As a consolidation
of several earlier acts, "[t]his statute occupies a central position within
Swedish labour law."'78  The Act applies to "the relationship between
employer and employee,"' 79 which in the Swedish context refers to the
relationship between the employers' association and the trade union.80
This means that, as a general rule, neither the employee nor, to a lesser
degree, the employer is treated in its individual capacity. The phrase also
indicates that the legislation covers both the public and the private sec-
tors of the economy.
It is interesting to note that while the Joint Regulation Act is
designed to give workers an equal voice in the making of decisions affect-
ing their working life,81 its very first section reserves from its effect the
relationship among the owners of the enterprise.82 This is especially in-
teresting when one considers the fact that the 1975 Swedish Companies
Act 3 "is based on the idea that ownership is the sole legitimation for
decision making."84 In keeping with this deference to ownership inter-
ests, the Act reserves some very crucial rights vested in the shareholders,
and thereby excludes them from delegation to codetermination mecha-
nisms by the board of directors. 85
77. SFS 1976:580, English translation reprinted in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 59, app. 1 at
234-46.
78. Sigeman, supra note 14, at 133. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the full
ramifications of this Act. For a brief, but full, discussion of how the Act fits into the overall
scheme of Swedish labor law, see id. at 136-42. It is important to note at the outset that the
conservative parties came into power after the passage of this Act and, during their term in
office, there was no serious attempt to repeal the Act. See, id. at 132-33. One can at least
assume this speaks to the degree of consensus surrounding the Act.
79. Joint Regulation Act § 1, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1, at 234.
80. See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 91; Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 152.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 & 53-57.
82. The purpose of the Act is to provide workers a role in decision-making. Notwith-
standing such purpose, the reservation of corporate decision-making law from the scope of the
Act appears to indicate the depth of the Act's concession to "managerial prerogative." Joint
Regulation Act § 1, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 234.
83. SFS 1975:1385.
84. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 148 (emphasis in original).
85. The board can only delegate to the codetermination process those powers it enjoys
itself. A situation where the owners would be asked to allow a delegation of rights reserved to
shareholders has never arisen. Cf id. at 148-49 (discussing "ownership integrity"). The rights
reserved include the right to sell shares and "the right of liquidating the company." Id. There
is one additional limitation of note. The Joint Regulation Act allows workers to participate in
identifying the "aim and direction" of the enterprise, Joint Regulation Act § 2, F. SCHMIDT
Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 234, except in certain identified circumstances, id. (the list
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The Act consists of twelve distinct parts and has seventy sections. 6
"The most essential innovation in the. .. [Act] is the expansion of pre-
viously existing rights of negotiation. According to the Act, an employer
is obligated to take the initiative in beginning negotiations with trade
unions at the company before decisions are made on major issues."87
Major issues are those involving "an important alteration" of an em-
ployer's activities."8 This mandatory initiative is designed to replace uni-
lateral decision-making by the employer with a bilateral decision-making
process. 9 What this means is that the employer is obliged, subject to
"very limited exceptions," to defer making or implementing a decision
until negotiations required by the Act have taken place.9°
The Act neither explicitly sets out a time framework for negotia-
tions nor identifies those topics which constitute "important altera-
tion[s]" to the employer's activity or "important alteration[s] of work or
employment conditions for employees."9" Despite this vagueness, the
Act should be read to require "the employer to begin negotiations at a
very early stage and to continue to negotiate throughout the decision
making process."92 A recent labor court case has given some indications
includes religious, scientific, cooperative and political activities), and in regard to the "demo-
cratic process" in the public sector, see generally, L FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 48-9. "This
is not intended to exclude discussions between management and employees about purposes-it
is merely that the scheme of the Joint Regulation Act, with its obligatory negotiations etc.,
. . . is not to be available." F. SCHMDT, supra note 50, at 94. This situation, where a topic is
removed from the statutorally mandated scope of negotiation, is parallel to the "mandatory-
permissive" dichotomy arising under the NLRA. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
86. Joint Regulation Act, F. SCHmIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 234-46. §§ 1-
6 are definitional; §§ 7-9 deal with the rights of employers and employees to associate; §§ 10-
17 deal with the right of an organization of employees to negotiate with an employer;, §§ 18-22
deal with a union's right to information; §§ 23-31 define collective agreement; § 32 deals with
the right of the employees to joint regulation through collective agreement; §§ 33-37 deal with
decision making in disputes over interpretation of agreements; §§ 38-40 deal with a limited
union right of veto in protecting "public" rights; §§ 41-45 concern the peace obligation of the
parties to an agreement; §§ 46-53 deal with negotiation rights and legal proceedings.
87. L. FORSEBAcK, supra note 50, at 41. Section 11 states:
Before an employer decides on important alteration to his activity, he shall, on his
own initiative, negotiate with an organisation of employees in relation to which he is
bound by collective agreement. The same shall be observed before an employer de-
cides on important alteration of work or employment conditions for employees who
belong to the organisation.
If urgent reasons so necessitate, the employer may make and implement a decision
before. . . [fulfilling] his duty to negotiate. . . .
Joint Regulation Act § 11, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 235-36.
88. Joint Regulation Act § 11, F. SCHMIm Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 235-36.
89. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 153.
90. Id. at 153.
91. Joint Regulation Act § 11, F. SCHMiT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 235-36.
92. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 155 (discussing commentary in the Bill to the Act). It is
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of the topics to be covered by the Act.9 3 In addition, the legislature has
indicated that it feels that the scope of such negotiations includes "all
matters . . . of a range and meaning to employees about which one
would generally assume the union wished to negotiate." 94 Thus, in addi-
tion to the duty to initiate negotiation, the Act also requires that the
employer and employee organizations negotiate with regard to any addi-
tional decisions which concern an employee-union member if the em-
ployee organization should so request.95
What is most striking about this duty, however, is that at the end of
the process, i.e., once negotiations are over, the employer, unless there is
an agreement of the parties to the contrary, retains the ultimate right to
make the decision. The Act seeks to establish a bilateral process and
allows the union to demand codetermination rights in collective agree-
ments but limits industrial actions to coerce such rights to the time after
a collective bargaining agreement has expired unless the topic has been
freed from the peace obligation in the negotiation process.
96
The Act combines the duty to negotiate with rules on the right to
obtain information. The employer is required
to keep the local trade union organization informed on how operations
are progressing, economically and in terms of production. He is also
obligated to. . . [inform the union] about the guidelines of company
personnel policy. . . [and] to take various steps to make it easier for
employees to obtain information concerning the situation of the
important to mention the fact that negotiations, if unsuccessful at the local level, will be more
or less routinely referred for central negotiation. Since this is a time consuming process, it is
particularly significant that the negotiations be started at an early stage. Cf. Joint Regulation
Act § 14(1), F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 236 (relating to reference for
centralized negotiations).
93. AD 1979:188.
94. Commentary, Bill to the Act for the 1976 Joint Regulation Act at 353, quoted In
Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 154. It may be helpful in understanding the exact scope of the
statutory duty to examine which topics are not included. The duty does not encompass "deci-
sions and measures of the employer which recur from time to time in substantially the same
way, and are thus dealt with in accordance with an established routine." Bill 105, app. 1, at
353, quoted in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 108. "Nor does the duty. . . arise in the case of
replacement of worn out items, where business goes on as before [footnote omitted]." Id.
For an interesting list of included topics (including facilities closure/relocation) see L.
FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 41.
95. Joint Regulation Act § 12, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. I at 236.
Since the scope of section 11 is already so broad, it is quite possible that it may yet swallow the
additional topics which would arise under section 12. Compare id. § 11, app. I at 235-36, with
id. § 12, app. 1 at 236.
96. See id. §§ 41-45, app. I at 241-42.
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This requirement is especially important in light of the aims of the Act to
create a bilateral decision-making process in which the union is an equal
partner and to afford the union a more equal opportunity for insight into
the enterprise.
Another mechanism for achieving joint regulation is the "priority of
interpretation."98 Prior to the Act, if a dispute arose as to the meaning of
a collective agreement, until the dispute was legally resolved the em-
ployer could require that its interpretation be implemented. This power
was assumed to flow from the owner's prerogative to direct the enter-
prise. What this practically meant was that "the employee was directed
to obey first and challenge later." 99 Under the Act,"°° the priority of
interpretation lies with the employer regarding legal disputes over pay. t01
A priority lies with the union in three circumstances. 10 2 The importance
of this priority lies in the fact that the priority of interpretation is an
interim power to decide. The final decision-making power rests with the
parties to the contract themselves, or, where they fail to agree, with arbi-
97. L. FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 41-2. See Joint Regulation Act §§ 18-22, F.
SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. I at 236-37.
98. Where a collective agreement contains provisions about a right of joint regulation
for employees in a matter which is referred to in section 32 and, in a particular case,
a dispute arises over application of any such provision or of a decision which has
been made by virtue thereof, the employee party's view [of the interpretation of the
agreement] shall apply until that dispute has been finally tried. The same shall apply
in a dispute over provisions in a collective agreement concerning [disciplinary] meas-
ures for an employee who has committed a breach of contract.
Joint Regulation Act § 33, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 239 (bracketed
material added by translator). For the entire section of the statute dealing with this issue, see
id. §§ 33-40, app. I at 239-41.
99. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 159. This rule was built on labor court judgment 1934:179
and an earlier labor court decision, 1929:29 ("fT]he employee, under the collective agreement,
had a duty to perform all such work for the benefit of the employer... so long as the work
fell within the worker's general competence."). Labor Court Decision 1929:29, quoted in F.
SCHmIDT, supra note 50, at 79.
100. Employee organizations may have priority of interpretation under other substantive
legislation as well. Se4 eg., 1974 Act on the Position of the Union Representative in the
Workplace, SPS 1974:358; amended by SFS 1975:356, SFS 1976:514, SFS 1982:87.
101. Joint Regulation Act § 35, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 239.
102. The priority of interpretation rests with the established union:
(1) in disputes over a collective agreement on joint regulation or a decision made
under such an agreement; (2) in disputes over "provisions in a collective agreement
concerning (disciplinary) measures for an employee" (§ 33) and, most importantly,
(3) in disputes over a member's contractual duty to perform work (§ 34) [sic].
Fahibeck, supra note 18, at 161. Although beyond the scope of this Note, notice the limited
union veto provided for in Joint Regulation Act §§ 38-40, F. SCH?,IiDT Translation, supra note
59, app. 1 at 24041. See generally id. at 112-14.
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trators or the labor court."' 3 Despite its interim effect, the primary im-
portance of the power is as "a means to exert pressure on the employer in
order to induce him to come to amicable solutions for differences over
interpretation." 1"
The core of the Joint Regulation Act is the collective agreement. 105
This is made explicit by section 32 of the Act which says:
Between parties who conclude a collective agreement on wages
and general conditions of employment there should, if the employer
party so requests, also be concluded a collective agreement on a right
of joint regulation for the employees in matters which concern the con-
clusion and termination of contracts of employment, the management
and distribution of the work, and the activities of the business in other
respects.
In collective agreements on joint regulation the parties, observing§ 3 of this Act, are free to decide what decisions which would other-
wise have been taken by the employer shall instead be taken by repre-
sentatives of the employees or by a body composed of representatives
of both parties. 1° '
Therefore, although the Act does not detail what such an agreement
might look like, it is clear that a division of decision-making powers
among employer, employee and joint regulation bodies with representa-
tives of each is what the legislature envisioned."0 7 In order to achieve
such agreements, a demand by the employee side to include a matter in a
joint regulation agreement will have the effect of freeing that matter from
the peace obligation that would otherwise apply.108 In the final analysis,
therefore, the implications of the Act for the role of the worker in the
determination of workplace decisions depends on the demands of his or
her union at the bargaining table and its ability to back up these demands
with industrial action.
103. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 160.
104. Id. at 161.
105. See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 81.
106. Joint Regulation Act § 32, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 239. The
second paragraph was added by 1977 amendment and is set out at Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at
166 n.24. For an interesting side note about the role of the number 32 in Swedish labor law
and for a good discussion of how the use of that number symbolized a turning of ideological
tables, see J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 93-4.
107. That this is the ultimate goal of the process is made explicit by amendments to the Act
passed in 1977. See supra text accompanying note 106, para. 2. See also section 33(1), which
was amended at the same time to state that: "The provisions herein shall not, however, give
the employee party any power to implement a decision on the employer's behalf." Fahlbeck,
supra note 18, at 166 n.24.
108. F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 81.
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B. Swedish Conceptions of Industrial Democracy
The Social Democratic Party and its ideology have had, and con-
tinue to have, a great deal to do with the concepts of "industrial" and
"economic" democracy that are at the heart of Medbestammande legisla-
tion.l"o While any detailed exploration of these concepts and their ideo-
logical roots is beyond the scope of this Note, the basic ideas at their core
are: (1) that the distribution of power in the workplace, as symbolized by
section 32 of the SAF (employers' association) Constitution,' 10 and the
prerogatives for management which such distribution entails are con-
trary to the idea of democracy and (2) that democracy in the political
sphere requires a parallel in the industrial sphere."1 In a democratic
society, "the notion that the right for employers unilaterally to direct and
distribute work is outmoded, and should be replaced . ... .""'
There are four factors underlying the Medbestammande legislative
scheme adopted by the Social Democrats and embodied in the statutes
discussed here.113 First, the statutory rules are designed to be "basically
a legislative framework" and are "based on evolution. . and on grad-
ual change rather than a sudden volteface."'11 The legislation provides
an arena in which the parties are to thrash out the ultimate results. It
provides only a process, not a solution. Second, joint regulation "is
based on an indirect form of democracy, where employees are repre-
sented by established trade unions"' 5 and where the measure of democ-
109. See generally H. TINGSTEN, THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, THEIR IDEOLOGI-
CAL DEVELOPMENT (1973). One of the best political overviews in this area is provided by W.
KoRPi, THE WORKING CLASS IN WELFARE CAPITALISM, WORK UNIONS AND POLMCS IN
SWEDEN (1978).
The more "macroeconomic" elements of "economic democracy" as contrasted to the
more modest "industrial" democracy and recent attempts to statutorily achieve such aims are
not dealt with here. See generally P_ MEIDNER, EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUNDS AND CAPI-
TAL FORMATION: A TOPICAL ISSUE IN SWEDISH POLrIcs (Working Life in Sweden No. 6,
June 1978); J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 97; Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 149.
110. ". . [Tihe employer is entitled to direct and distribute the work, to hire and dismiss
workers at will, and to employ workers whether they are organised or not." Section 23 of the
"December Compromise" (which later became section 32 of the SAF Constitution), quoted in
F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 64.
111. Cf. S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 93 (discussing some of the roots of industrial democ-
racy in Sweden).
112. Fallbeck, supra note 18, at 150.
113. The structure and general framework as well as some of the specific language of this
discussion comes from the analysis by R. Fahlbeck. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 149-52. The
ideas are further informed by F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, passim, and lectures on Social De-
mocracy by Douglas Kellner, Asst. Prof. of Philosophy, Univ. of Texas, in a class in Marxist
philosophy at the University in Fall 1981.
114. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 151.
115. Id.
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racy is the workers' input into the process and not the individual
worker's situation.116 The first of these ideas is predicated on the concept
that both employers and employees contribute to and take risks for the
enterprise and that "decision making is to be shared by the contributors
of capital and the contributors of labour in a common decisionmaking
process where employees participate through their trade unions." '117 The
second denies the individual worker standing in the process in an effort
to "collectivize" employee interests within the legislative arena. It holds,
in short, that since the employee is represented in the process, the process
is democratic. s
The third factor is that these statutes do not interfere with the pri-
mary goal of the free enterprise system: profits. Commentary in the bill
to the Act emphasizes the need for efficiency in the workplace as a means
of fortifying the basic economic aim of making profits. Under this the-
ory, greater efficiency can be achieved through joint regulation. 1 9 The
final element is that information and participation are viewed as likely to
reduce employee alienation and increase employee satisfaction and pro-
ductivity. 20 The Medbestammande legislation established collective bar-
gaining as the means through which to determine the goals of workplace
democracy and the forum in which such a determination is to be
made. 121
C. The Degree of Bifurcation of Worker Organizations (Workers'
Unions v. Workers Organized qua Workers)
As has been noted earlier,122 the Medbestammande legislation in
Sweden to a large extent does not provide individual employees with
rights.123 "[I]t must always be a trade union which acts on the employee
side. The employer-however small the enterprise may be-may act
116. Id. at 151-52.
117. Id. at 151.
118. Id. at 151-52, 156.
119. Id. at 151. Cf id. at 156 (on the conflict of the ideological and the practical aspects of
joint regulation).
120. Id. at 151 and 156; S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 7. See generally A. Sandberg, From
Satisfaction to Democratization: On Sociology and Working Life Changes In Sveden (Working
Papers 1980) (discussing these issues from a sociological perspective).
121. Cf S. PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 4 ("Proponents of codetermination have been em-
phasizing the psychological and sociological effects of labor participation on workers (par-
ticipatory democracy, humanization of labor) rather than its potential of raising total labor
compensation.").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80 and 115-16.
123. Indeed, "[i]ndividual employees are subject to no less authority than before."
Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 152 [footnote omitted].
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alone, but the interests of the employee side must always be taken care of
by a trade union."' 2
The only prominent exception to this generalization is the works
council, 125 where employees qua employees, not as members of a trade
union, are represented. This is the one body with potential codetermina-
tion powers which preexisted the 1976 Joint Regulation Act and even the
1973 predecessor legislation to the Board Representation Act. 2 6 Despite
their longevity and theoretical potential as worker participation mecha-
nisms, the Swedish works councils are under attack with critics asking
not how to make them more effective, but whether it is necessary to give
them any real power at all' 27 Even here, however, the employees are
represented as a whole. It seems that even if employee interests are not
always treated as trade union interests, the best generalization about
Swedish labor law and its relationship to workers is that the law "collec-
tivizes" employee interests before it affords them protection.
Most modem Swedish statutes "expressly permit the employer to
apply collective agreements both to members of the signatory union and
to other employees within the scope of the agreement."'128 Since "joint
regulation in most cases affects union members as well as non-members,
[t]his means that Swedish labour law has to a large extent de facto
adopted the American majority rule, a notion which was formerly
strongly repudiated by the Swedish legislature."'129 Because the union ef-
fectively speaks for all the workers in the enterprise and not merely its
membership, the effect of this defacto change may very well be to lessen
124. F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 91.
125. Works councils vary from country to country in composition, function and structure.
What they have in common, however, is that they are plant specific bodies on which at least
some representatives of the plant employees are entitled to participate. Their purpose is to
provide information to workers, and, depending on the country, to afford some degree of
worker input. See also supra text accompanying note 22.
126. Works councils under the Swedish scheme of codetermination are primarily informa-
tional and serve as conduits of employee-employer consultation. For a brief overview, see L.
FORSEBACK, supra note 50, at 38-39.
127. F. SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 79. The general hostility of trade unions to works
councils arises from their strength in Germany. Swedish unions perceive that a loss in mem-
bership in German unions is the result of stronger works councils there. Id. at 80. An addi-
tional handicap is that Swedish works councils have employee and employer representatives.
128. Fahlbeck, supra note 18, at 152. For an insightful analysis of the worker representa-
tive function of Swedish unions and the role Swedish labor law assigns to worker representa-
tive organizations, see Summers, Comparisons in Labor Law: Sweden and the United States, 7
INDUS. REL LJ. 1 (1985).
129. Id. By applying the agreement to members and nonmembers alike, the union be-
comes, in some ways, the exclusive representative of the employees.
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the tendency to treat workers qua workers and workers as trade union
members differently.
V. A REVIEW OF WORKER PARTICIPATION
MECHANISMS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
A. Mechanisms
There are three chief methods of advancing worker participation in
the Federal Republic of Germany. These are: collective agreements,
work level codetermination through works councils and supervisory
board level codetermination.
1. Collective Agreements
Collective agreements are industry-wide and negotiated by central-
ized workers' unions and employers' associations. 130 As a result of prac-
tical limitations imposed by the large number of employers and workers
covered by such agreements, and of the history of the labor movement
and workers committees in Germany, "the collective agreement has been
rather narrowly limited to wages, hours and closely related subjects
which can be regulated by the general rules of industry agreements." '131
The influence of the union and the collective agreement, however, has
been somewhat strengthened by the Works Council Act of 1972.132
130. This highly centralized structure removes much of the strife of labor-management
confrontation in the collective bargaining process from the experience of the average worker.
See Summers, supra note 21, at 371-73.
131. See id. at 380.
[T]he unions were willing to accept factory councils only on the condition that
the councils not encroach on the functions of unions or act in conflict with the un-
ions' collective agreements. The result. . .[was] legally established works councils
at the plant level with a limited role in plant decisions and substantial independence
of the employer. [These] . . .were constitutional organs of the plant, not branches
of the trade unions. [footnote omitted] ...[N]egotiation of wages, hours and other
economic terms was left to the trade unions. The unions were willing to accept this
statutory plant organization only because they lacked effective organization of their
own at the plant level. The Works Council Act [of 1920] provided an immediate
structure of worker representation which the unions were not ready to provide.
Id. at 375. After the Second World War, "[ellected works councils were reestablished as part
of the shop constitution, separate from the trade unions. . . .The Works Council Act of
1952 solidified this divided system of representation, and the Works Council Act of 1972 con-
tinued it." Id. See J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 6.
132. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] Art. 77, (W. Ger.) Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I
13, translated in COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, GERMAN WORKS COUNCIL ACT OF 1972 (H.
Beinhauer trans. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WORKS COUNCIL ACT]. This section removes
from management-works council negotiations those matters covered by the collective bargain-
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2. Works Councils
The 1972 Works Council Act grants the works councils rights
which pertain to hiring, firing, transfers, mergers and other structural
changes, social matters, the working place, operational planning, person-
nel planning and vocational training.133 Any enterprise with five or more
employees (aged eighteen years or older) is required to have a works
council, although enterprises with less than twenty-one employees need
have only one representative on the council. 34 The Act grants the works
council a genuine voice in decisions about hiring, firing, transfers and
changes in classification. It is no longer enough for the employer to in-
form the works council of its decisions in these areas. The employer
must get the works council's consent and the works council may refuse
to give that consent for a number of reasons specified in the Act. 135 If
the works council refuses to consent, the employer may ask the labor
court to intervene and give its consent instead. 136 If the employer goes to
the labor court, he or she cannot take the disputed action in the interim
unless "urgently required."1 37 The works council has an even greater
role if the employer's action involves a firing.138
In addition to the relatively individual-oriented personnel matters
discussed above, the works council is also intimately involved in broader
enterprise decisions. Under section 111 of the Act,13 9 management and
the works council must agree on structural changes such as "reduction
ing agreement, affording unions greater exclusivity as bargaining partners in collective
negotiations.
133. Id. at 2 (translator's introduction). These rights are chiefly secured by the following
sections of the Act: hiring: §§ 95, 99, 105; dismissal: §§ 95, 99, 102, 103, 123; transfers:
§§ 95, 99; mergers: § 111; working place: §§ 82, 90, 91, 95, 116; structural changes: §§ 111,
123; personnel planning: §§ 92-95, 99, 100; vocational training §§ 6, 38, 70, 82, 92; social
matters: § 87; operational planning §§ 90, 91.
134. Id. § 9 at 27-8. The structure of works councils, particularly with regard to the divi-
sion into economic committee and works assembly, id. §§ 42-46 at 46-9 and id. §§ 106-10 at
84-8, is a topic beyond the scope of this Note; the constitution and relative functions of these
entities are easily enough ascertained from the statute itself. Cf. SEGFARTH, SHAW, FAIR-
WEATHER & GERALDEN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN WEST GERmANY AND THE
UNITED STATES 104-05 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SErFARTH] on economic committees.
135. WoRKs CouNcrL Acr, supra note 132, at 2-3 (translator's introduction). See also id.
§§ 99-100 at 79-81. Note that one of the reasons for refusing consent could be that the pro-
posed alteration is contrary to guidelines or even imposed on the enterprise by either an em-
ployer-works council decision under § 93 or by a conciliation board ruling against
management's wishes. See id. § 93 at 76, § 95 at 76-77 (on the conciliation board and person-
nel guidelines).
136. Id. §§ 99-100 at 79-81.
137. Id. See also id. at 3 (translators introduction).
138. See id. § 95 at 76-77, § 123 at 105-107, § 99 at 79-80, § 102 at 81-83, § 103 at 83-84.
139. See id. § 111 at 88.
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or shutdown of production, mergers, relocation of the entire enterprise or
part of it, basic changes in the enterprise's organization or purpose and
introduction of fundamentally new working and production meth-
ods." 1" Under section 123, takeovers also fall into this category. 141 If
the parties fail to agree on such a decision, the Act requires mediation by
a conciliation board consisting of labor and management representatives
and a "neutral" chair 142-- but it is the parties who must ultimately agree.
Where working periods or methods of pay tied to efficiency (e.g.
piece work) are not fixed by statute or collective agreement, section 87 of
the Works Council Act vests the works council with codetermination
rights as to changes in these areas as well. 143 In addition, other sections
require employers to provide the works council both with information
about changes within working places, in job surroundings or in other
operational and working conditions plans, and with reasonable time to
demand measures to alleviate or compensate for potential problems. 144
Works councils must also be consulted on matters of vocational train-
ing145 and personnel guidelines, planning and forms.146
While the Act spells out several other changes in West German la-
bor law including provisions safeguarding individual rights of the em-
ployee 47 and expanding the union's right to a presence in the
workplace,1 48 the most important change embodied in the Act is the ex-
pansion of the scope and function of the conciliation board. 149 Prior to
the Act, the function of the board was to mediate. 5 ' Today, under the
Act, the mediation function continues,151 but the board itself can now
140. Id. at 4 (translator's introduction). If, however, the situation is one dealing with "ef-
fects" of a decision rather than the decision itself, the parties must agree in face of losing their
input. If they fail to agree, a decision will be made for them by a conciliation board. Id.
141. Id. § 123 at 105-107.
142. Id. § 124 at 108-110.
143. Id. § 87 at 72-73.
144. Id. §§ 90-91 at 74-75.
145. Id. §§ 96-98 at 77-79.
146. Id. §§ 92-95 at 75-76. In enterprises with more than 1000 employees, works councils
must be given special input into personnel guidelines. See id. at 7 (translator's introduction).
147. Id. §§ 81-5 at 69-71. This is unique among German labor statutes.
148. See, eg., id. § 2 at 23; § 31 at 40 & § 43 at 47-8. See also id. § 74 at 63-4 (on union
activities of works council members).
149. A conciliation board consists of an equal number of works council and management
representatives plus a "neutral" chair, selected by the parties jointly or, if they fail to agree, by
the labor court, with a tie-breaking (called "casting") vote. Id. § 76 at 64-6.
150. See SEGEARTH, supra note 134, at 113-14.
151. See, e.g., WORKS COUNCIL ACT, supra note 132, § 95 at 76-7 (on changes in guide-
lines for classification, transfers and hiring); id. § 94 at 76 (on, inter alia, job application
forms); id. § 91 at 75 (on, inter alia, workplace or job surroundings changes). However, not all
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decide certain issues if the parties fail to come to an agreement.152
3. Supervisory Board Level Participation
Under the provisions of three different statutes, workers are repre-
sented on the supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat)15 3 of enterprises in the
Montan sector of the economy,154 in all joint-stock companies,1 55 all lim-
ited liability companies (GmbH) and in profit-oriented and trading coop-
eratives employing more than fifty employees. 56 Each statute, and
consequently each statutorily created group of enterprises, has its own
degree of worker representation on the board ranging from the so-called
"stringent parity" ' 7 of labor and shareholders in the Montan sector to
the one-third worker participation in the smaller enterprises. 15
Outside the Montan sector, which is governed by a statute expressly
dealing with that sector of the economy,15 9 and which is not discussed in
situations give both (as opposed to only one) of the two parties access to the board. Therefore,
a party must be careful to consult the statute.
152. Despite these relatively limited situations where management can lose, under the stat-
ute, its prerogative to refer such matters to a conciliation board (on which it does not have a
majority) if it fails to come to an agreement with the works council, management generally
retains the right to refuse to agree with a works council and to make that decision "stick"
because of the limited scope of the issues the board can actually decide.
153. In German joint stock companies, "[i]mmediate control of the company is split be-
tween the supervising board (Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand)." J. FUR-
LONG, supra note 4, at 7. The supervisory board "sometimes is compared to the board of
directors of American companies, while the management board is likened to the American
management committee. The German system... , however, doesn't allow anyone to belong
to both bodies." Id. While the "size of the role to be given the supervisory board in corporate
affairs differs from company to company," it has two main duties: "to appoint (and, if neces-
sary, fire) members of the management board, and to oversee the management board's work."
Id. Cf. M. PELTZER, Co-DETERMINATION ACT 1976, MrrES'IMMUNGSGESETZ 1976 (2d
ed. 1980), at 5 (describing the German two-tier board system).
154. Montan is the term used to describe the coal, iron and steel industries. J. FURLONG,
supra note 4, at 4.
155. But see M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 207-8. "If the company employs no employ-
ees or-this is disputed-less than 5, no labor participation is necessary."
156. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] Art 76-7, 1952 BGB1 I at 681 [hereinafter cited
as Enterprise Organization Act]. See also M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 7. It is significant
that there is no mandatory representative for workers if the form of the enterprise is a general
partnership, even if all of the partners are corporations. Id. at 8.
157. M. PELTzER, supra note 153, at 1.
158. Enterprise Organization Act, supra note 156, §§ 76-77.
159. For a brief but relatively complete discussion of the coverage of the Montan Act, see
Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1951, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I at 347; see also S. PwovicH, supra
note 5, at 68-70. It is sufficient for the purposes of this discussion to say that, in Montan
enterprises, the shareholders meeting elects the owners' representatives and confirms the work-
ers' representatives (some of whom are nominated by the works council subject to union veto
and some of whom are nominated by the union) such that representatives of each are equal in
number (eg., if the workers have five representatives, so do the shareholders) and one repre-
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this Note, the degree of worker representation on the supervisory board
depends on whether the enterprise falls within the terms of one of two
key statutes: the Enterprise Organization Act of 19521° or the
Codetermination Act of 1976. 161 If the enterprise is organized as a joint-
stock company, or if it has more than 500 employees and is organized as
a Gewerksschaft, a profit-oriented cooperative, a limited liability com-
pany or a certain kind of partnership, 161 it is covered by one of these two
Acts. 163 If it falls within one of these groups and employs more than
2000 workers, it is covered by the Codetermination Act of 1976.164 If its
form and structure fits within one of these groups but it employs 2000
workers or less, it is covered by the Enterprise Organization Act.
Before the enactment of the Codetermination Act of 1976, which
sets apart larger enterprises outside the Montan for special treatment, the
Enterprise Organization Act provided the general legislative framework
within which workers and management engaged in managerial
codetermination. 165 The 1952 Act was amended in 1972 and now pro-
vides for one-third of the members of the supervisory board of an affected
enterprise to be elected by the firm's employees. 166 The shareholders'
sentative of each group (the employees and the owners) is "external." The council itself elects,
by majority vote, a "neutral"member to prevent stagnation due to tie votes and to represent
the "public interest." Id.
160. Enterprise Organization Act, supra note 156, at 681.
161. Gesetz fiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer, 1976 [BGB1] I at 1153. Two
translations are interchangeably used here in order to help clarify statutory translation: J.
FURLONG, supra note 4, app. 137-163 and M. PELTZER supra note 153, at 35. [Hereinafter
cited as Codetermination Act of 1976]. In order to accurately understand the scope of the Act,
one must realize that Article I, § 1(4) of the 1976 Act provided in part, that the Act "does not
apply to enterprises which directly and predominantly serve 1. political, religious, charitable,
educational, scientific or artistic purposes, or 2. the purposes of reporting or free expression of
opinion. .. " Codetermination Act of 1976, art. I, § 1(4), J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app, at
138. This exception applies to the Enterprise Organization Act as well. Enterprise Organiza-
tion Act, supra note 156.
162. Discussions of partnerships covered by these statutes tend to be very complex. For a
relatively simple, albeit incomplete, discussion see M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 10.
163. See Enterprise Organization Act, supra note 156, §§ 76-7; Codetermination Act of
1976, art. I § 1(1), J. FURLONG, supra note 161, app. at 137. Certain enterprises are, therefore,
excluded from the general worker participation scheme because of their organization or size.
164. The concept of a "jobholder" is defined in Codetermination Act of 1976, art. II, J,
FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 138. Coverage of the 1976 Act is discussed in Art. I §§ 1(1)-
(2), id. at 137. Estimates suggest that around 650 companies fall under the new law. M.
PELTZER, supra note 153, at 4-5.
165. S. PElovicH, supra note 5, at 71. The 1952 Act actually spelled out all levels of
codetermination, other than the collective bargaining agreement, which were in effect at the
time. Id. The relevant, or, perhaps, remaining provisions of the Act, however, deal with
worker representation on the Aufsichtsrat. Id. at 71-72. "[A]bout a million jobholders con-
tinue to be affected by this arrangement." J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 22.
166. WORKS COUNCIL ACT, supra note 132, at 13 (translator's introduction); Enterprise
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representatives therefore hold two-thirds of the seats and the workers'
representatives hold one-third. The size of the board is not fixed by the
1952 Act itself, but the 1965 Joint Stock Company law sets a minimum
board size of three.167 On supervisory boards with one or two labor rep-
resentatives, each must be an employee of the enterprise.1 68 In the case
where there are two labor representatives, one must be a blue-collar and
one a white-collar employee. 69 The additional worker seats, if there are
more than two, may be occupied by union representatives but "have
tended to go to company jobholders."' 70 The worker representatives are
selected in direct general elections.171 Significantly, this "[o]ne-third rep-
resentation generally [has] limited workers to a consultative, rather than
co-determining, role. ... "I'
The most recent, and controversial,"7 3 board level representation
legislation, the Codetermination Act of 1976, gives workers and share-
holders an equal number of seats on supervisory boards of companies to
which the Act applies. 74 The formation, composition and principles of
appointment for the members of the supervisory board are detailed in the
Act.' Of particular interest is the fact that two or three of the worker
representatives on the board are "trade-union representatives"1 76 and
Organization Act, supra note 156, §§ 76-7. See M. PELTzER, supra note 153, at 7-8; see also S.
PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 72 (illustration).




171. Id. Note that, unlike under the 1976 Act, there is no union representation. See, e g.,
Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XVI., J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 149.
172. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 22. This is why there was such pressure for the 1976
Act giving workers more of a presence on the Aufsichtsrat.
173. See eg., id. at 26-7; Meissel & Fogel, supra note 6, at 182. With parity also comes a
mechanism by which the shareholders' side of the board can prevail in case of a tie.
174. Codetermination Act of 1976, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 141-42. According
to art. 7, "[t]he supervisory board of the enterprise with, as a rule,
1. Not more than 10,000 jobholders, is composed of six representatives each of the
shareholders and jobholders;
2. more than 10,000 but no more than 20,000 jobholders, is composed of eight rep-
resentatives each of the shareholders and the jobholders;
3. more than 20,000 jobholders, is composed of ten representatives each of share-
holders and jobholders."
Id. at § 7(2), app. at 141. Enterprises may elect to have a bigger, but not a smaller, board. Id.
175. Id. at §§ 6-9, app. at 140-43.
176. The jobholder supervisory board members must include:
1. in a supervisory board with six jobholder members: four jobholders of the enter-
prise and two trade union representatives;
2. in a supervisory board with eight jobholder members: six jobholders of the en-
terprise and two trade-union members:
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that the employee representatives who come from the enterprise "must
reflect the ratio of wage-earning and salaried employees in the com-
pany."' 177 The shareholders' representatives are selected "by the organ
empowered by law, bylaws, articles of partnership or statute to elect
members of the supervisory board."17  If the enterprise employs no
more than 8000 people, the employee representatives are normally se-
lected through "direct election" '179 and if it employs more than 8000,
selection is generally through electors.180 The employees are, however,
entitled to opt for the alternative method of selection (i.e. direct election
instead of through electors or through electors instead of by direct
election). 181
Article 27 of the Act sets out the procedure for the election of the
chair of the supervisory board.8 2 Since the usual procedure requires a
two-thirds majority of the board,' 83 the labor and owner representatives
have to agree on the chair. It is possible, however, for the shareholders'
representatives to have the final say in the matter if the parties cannot
agree. 184
The apparent parity of employee representation under the
Codetermination Act is not total. In order to help the proposal with-
stand constitutional challenge," 5 Article 29 was added to the Act. 86 It
3. in a supervisory board with ten jobholder members: seven jobholders of the
enterprise and three trade union representatives.
Id. at art. VII §§ 2(1)-(3), app. at 141-42.
177. M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 17. See Codetermination Act of 1976, art XV § 2, J.
FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 147. Salaried employees "must reflect the ratio of employees
with (cp. § 5 subsection 3) and without (cp. § 6 subsection 2 LMRA) managerial responsibil-
ity." M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 7.
178. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. VIII § 1, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 142.
179. Id. at art. IX § 2, app. at 143.
180. Id. at art. IX § 1, app. at 142.
181. Id. at art. IX §§ 1-3, app. at 142-43.
182. This provides in part: "Chairmembership in the Supervisory Board:
(1) The Supervisory board elects from its midst, with a majority of two thirds of the
number of members of which it must consist, one supervisory board chairman and one
deputy. (2) If the necessary majority according to Section 1 is not achieved in the
election of the. ..chairman or his deputy, a second ballot takes place. . . . In this
ballot, the shareholder supervisory-board members elect the supervisory-board chair-
man and the jobholder supervisory-board members elect the deputy ... " [empha-
sis added].
Id. art. XXVII, app. at 155.
183. Id.
184. Id. at art. XXVII § 2, app. at 155.
185. The "managerial prerogative" of the owners of the enterprise is, after all, ultimately
an incident of property and its protection as such is a rather delicate matter. It would seem
that the balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in First National Maintenance
is an attempt to shield the NLRA from the same kind of challenge discussed here.
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provides in part: "If a supervisory-board ballot results in a tie, the super-
visory-board chairman has two votes in a renewed ballot on the same
issue if it also results in a tie."1" 7 This mechanism is unreliable and "full
of pitfalls."'8 8 In a situation where the shareholders' and workers' repre-
sentative directors vote on a partisan basis, thereby dividing the votes
equally, the issue will ultimately be resolved in the shareholders' favor
since the chairperson is presumably always shareholder selected.189
The final element of worker participation provided by the 1976 Act
is the position of the Arbeitsdirektor.190 This is a position on the Vor-
stand, or managing board, of the company with powers and rights equal
to those of other Vorstand members. The exact duties of the Arbeit-
sdirektor are deliberately left vague by the Act.191 What is clear, how-
ever, is that the presence of this position on the Vorstand elevates matters
of social concern and personnel questions to the Vorstand level. 192
Perhaps the "sharpest contrast"' 93 between German and American
186. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XXIX, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 155-56.
See eg., M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 2. Compare Codetermination Act of 1976, art.
XXIX § 2, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 155-56 (tie-breaking under the Act) with Meissel
& Fogel, supra note 6, at 187 (discussing the tie-breaking method under the draft of the bill of
1974).
187. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XXIX, . FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 155.
188. M. PELrZER, supra note 153, at 2.
189. This ultimate shareholder control is augmented by the fact that the orstand, or man-
aging board, "is entitled legally to appeal any Aufsichtsrat veto of its plan to a special meeting
of the shareholders. The shareholders assembly may overrule such a [supervisory board] veto
with a 3/4 majority." J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 8. As a result of political compromise in
the ruling coalition at the time the Act was passed, however, there is a more pragmatic limita-
tion on worker-owner parity on the supervisory board. Id. at 96-97. This is the seat reserved
for a managerial white-collar employee. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XV § 2, id. app. at
147 ("The supervisory board must include at least. . . one managerial white-collar em-
ployee."). This "executive representative" would seem to have nothing to gain and everything
to lose by voting consistently with worker representatives. For a discussion of the entire Act,
see id. at 1-85; S. PEJovICH, supra note 5, at 74-7. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XXXIII,
J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 157. See also M. PEL.TzER, supra note 147, at 3 (discussing
membership rights of the Arbeitsdirektor).
190. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XXXIII, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 157.
See also M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 3 (discussing the Arbeitsdirektor).
191. Since the title is the same as a Vorstand member under the Montan Act, unions have
urged the parallel be applied in practice under the Act. Whether this will take place is an open
question. The reason for this vagueness was arguably, either in order to parallel the Montan
sector Arbeitsdirektor as urged by the unions or, alternatively, to avoid the sticky business of
defining such a position. If the provisions were left vague as a parallel, however, labor's vic-
tory is incomplete because a key to worker influence under Montan is that the person selected
as Arbeitsdirektor is subject to veto by the workers representatives on the Board. J. FURLONG,
supra note 4, at 12.
192. See M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 3 (discussing the Arbeitsdirektor).
193. Summers, supra note 21, at 382.
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workers' representation systems involves information. Under the Ger-
man scheme, codetermination requires that worker representatives,
whether on works councils 194 or on the supervisory board, 195 at least be
informed and consulted about virtually every major decision of the enter-
prise. A great many decisions (ranging from personnel forms 196 to plant
closures 197 and wages and hours1 98) are not only subject to consultation
but also to joint participation by labor and management. In contrast, in
the United States, because many of these decisions are not mandatory
subjects of bargaining, the employer can act unilaterally and labor is not
entitled to notice or information.199
B. German Conceptions of Industrial Democracy
"The fundamental tenet of Mitbestimmung advocates that democ-
racy cannot be limited to the political sphere but must be extended to
economic life as well. ' '2°" Viewed another way, "[c]odetermination be-
longs to the substance of the process of democraticization" of German
society201 The contradictions of political democracy and industrial oli-
garchy have been repeatedly discussed in the political arena:
In political life, you have equal rights because you can, for example,
co-determine in Bundestag elections who should be your government's
chief, and because your vote will carry exactly as much weight as the
vote of any other citizen of this country. In your work, things are
different. You have a lower rank than others.20 2
Like the Swedish theory,20 3 the German codetermination theory has
an element of economic democracy in it.2°  But the political pressure for
194. See, eg., WORKS COUNCIL ACT, supra note 153, §§ 106 at 84-85 (discussing what
information must be given to the economic committee), 90 at 74-75 (on information involving
remodeling or construction), 111 at 88 (discussing information regarding closure, relocations,
and mergers).
195. See Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XXXII, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 157.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 35 and 36.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 139-142.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 143.
199. Summers, supra note 21, at 382-83.
200. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 28.
201. Address by Bundeskanzler W. Brandt (Jan. 18, 1973), quoted in S. PEjovicH, supra
note 5, at 57. For a discussion from a more sociological perspective, see id. at 57-67.
202. Address to the Bundestag by then Chancellor-to-be H. Schmidt (Jan. 1969), quoted in
J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 28 (discussing Mitbestimmung).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 109-21.
204. See, eg., J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 29 ("The. . .assertion [is] that labor and
capital are equal because both are equally necessary to carry out productive work"). Cf. S.
PEJOVICH, supra note 5, at 65 (a discussion of the aims of codetermination in terms of employ-
ees' personal rights).
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control of corporate power in Germany has its roots in German history
and, more specifically, in the unique recent German experience with Na-
tional Socialism2 °5 as well as the significant political reaction thereto.
The seeds of such mechanisms are also found in conceptions of worker
participation embodied in Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution. 20
More importantly, these factors have come together and given rise to a
degree of labor-management cooperation which makes the low German
strike rate the envy of other European countries and the United States.2° 7
As a union leader has put it: "[c]onflicts are resolved steadily, not once a
year. There are no revolutions in truly co-determined companies."'2 s
This "good relation with capital"' ° on the part of German labor
has been termed a partnership and has given rise to the discussion of
European mechanisms as "consensus-building."21 0 While saying that la-
bor and capital in Germany view themselves as "social partners" might
be an overstatement, it is clear that the ideology of cooperation is at
work.211
Because of critical conditions following World War I and World War
II, German employers [have] accepted the principle that employees
should have the right to participate in one form or another in almost
all of the decisions of the enterprise. The unions likewise [have] ac-
cepted the view that the interests of the employees and employers were
not necessarily antagonistic and that they should share the responsibil-
ities for management of the enterprise.2 12
C. The Degree of Bifurcation of Worker Organization (Workers'
Unions v. Workers Organized qua Workers)
The difference between Germany and the United States in the at-
205. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting from the record of hearings of theBundestag
Labor and Social Committee of Oct. 16, 1974, and citing a labor federation "tract" from 1968).
206. CONSTITUnON OF WEIMAROF 1919, Reichsgeretzblatt [RGB1] at 1383. "The wage-
earning and salaried employees are called upon to cooperate, with equal rights and in commu-
nity with the entrepreneurs, on the regulation of wage and working conditions and on the total
economic development of the productive forces." Id., quoted in S. PaiOvicH, supra note 5, at
61.
207. J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 30.
208. Id. at 31.
209. Id.
210. Marshall, Government, Markets, and Consensus-Building Mechanisms, 1982 NAT'L
PRODucTIvrrY REv. 445, 448 (1982).
211. Cf. I. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 30-31. Cf. also S. PovicH, supra note 5, at 80.
(Executives and workers committees cooperated in ever more "institutionalized" ways.)
212. Summers, supra note 21, at 383.
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mosphere and intensity of employer opposition to worker participation213
may be largely due to the fact that worker participation in the United
States is solely through the union, while worker participation in Ger-
many, at least in the most sensitive areas of management, has been not
through the union, but rather through the works council.214 West Ger-
man employers apparently are more willing to share the decision-making
process with employee representatives once such representatives are per-
ceived as a part of the enterprise rather than as "outsiders," as union
officers and functionaries are often perceived by management. 215 "In-
deed, some believe that German employers accepted works councils and
agreed to expansion of their functions in order to limit the role of the
union at the plant level." '216
The composition of the various employee representative bodies may
give some insight into the issue. Works councils and employee represent-
atives under the Enterprise Organization Act of 1952 are generally com-
posed of employees 217 and not outside union officers or functionaries.
Under the Codetermination Act of 1976 some of the seats on the board
must be set aside for union representatives. 211 "This represented a signif-
icant change because, for the first time outside the coal and steel indus-
try, the union, as contrasted with the employees, was guaranteed a voice
in the management decisions of the enterprise."'2 19 Therefore, for the
213. See M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1856-1965 at
495-98 (1970) for a discussion of employer opposition in the United States.
214. Summers, supra note 21, at 384.
215. Id. at 373 ("[O]nce elected most works council members consider themselves to be
representatives of the workers in the shop, not arms or agents of the union." [footnote omit-
ted]). See also id. at 373 n.9 ("There may be close cooperation between the. . . works council
and the. . . union representatives, but. . .[they] remain distinct.")
216. Id. at 384. The fear of works councils felt by Swedish trade unions is based at least in
part on their success as a mechanism of worker participation in Germany. See supra notes 52-
53 and text accompanying notes 54-56.
217. In the case of the Enterprise Organization Act, "[i]f the firm's charter prescribes six
council [board] members, which requires two labor representatives, only employees of the firm
are eligible for the supervisory council. In the case of more employee representatives, at least
two must be members of the respective firm." S. PERJOVICH, supra note 5, at 71. Additional
members may come from outside, but there is no requirement that they do. By contrast, the
Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XVI § 2, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 149, requires
"outside" union representation from two or three of the labor representatives. Therefore
union representation on the board is less likely to occur under the 1952 Act.
In the case of works councils, unions have a role in nominating candidates. See WORKS
COUNCIL ACT, supra note 132, § 14 at 30-1. In spite of this, "once elected most works council
members consider themselves. . . not [to be] arms or agents of the union." Summers, supra
note 21, at 373 [footnote omitted].
218. Codetermination Act of 1976, art. XVI § 2, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 149.
219. Summers, supra note 21, at 384.
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first time, the workers would be required to choose "outside" representa-
tives to speak for them on the supervisory board.' z ° Nonetheless, both
works councils and supervisory board representation schemes provide for
election by workers of their representatives to these bodies." 1 As a final
note, the Works Council Act of 1972 provides the individual employee
with a catalog of personal rights independent of his rights as a part of the
collective group of "employees."' m
VI. FACTORS IN THE UNITED STATES LABOR
RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT THAT AFFECT THE
TRANSFERABILITY OF EUROPEAN MECHANISMS FOR
PARTICIPATION
The perspectives on managerial prerogative and worker participa-
tion which can be gained from evaluation of the West German and Swed-
ish systems provide a background against which American labor law,
and in particular the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA, can be evaluated. "This does not mean, [however, that] we can
borrow from another system; legal rules transplanted from one social
body to another are likely to be rejected." 3 The purpose of such analy-
sis is not to transfer the European systems to the United States but rather
to examine the possibility for change and the range of potential solutions.
In light of the rather exclusive focus of the NLRA and its underly-
ing premise that collective bargaining is the American method of worker
participation, the mechanisms of worker codetermination employed in
European nations probably could not be implemented under existing law.
A key problem is that works councils and worker representative mem-
bers on the board of directors of a United States -corporation might be
violative of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, in that either could be viewed
as an attempt by the owners "to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization, or contribute financial or
220. "The list of candidates is not established by the elctorate ... but the labor unions
themselves. Accordingly, the electorate has no [direct] influence on the choice of a candi-
date. . . ." M. PELTZER, supra note 153, at 149.
221. WORKS COUNCIL ACr, supra note 132, §§ 7-20 at 26-34, 124; Codetermination Act of
1976, arts. X-XVIII, XX, J. FURLONG, supra note 4, app. at 143-50, 150-51. As to board
representatives, the Codetermination Act of 1976 makes direct election optional, providing
(through electors) for both direct and indirect election.
222. See WORKS COUNCIL ACT, supra note 132, §§ 81-5 at 69-71.
223. Summers, supra note 21, at 368 [emphasis added]. But cf. Hyde, Beyond Collective
Bargaining: The Politicization of Labor Relations under Government Contract, 1982 Wisc. L
REv. 1, 38-9 (1982) (American labor relations are not as primarily determined by workplace
presence as is traditionally portrayed).
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other support . *. .. , Conversely, it has been urged that employee
and shareholder-director cooperation would subject the union to charges
of violating section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA which prohibits a union
from "restrain[ing] or coerc[ing]. . . an employer in the. . . adjustment
of grievances." '2 2 5 The history of employee representation schemes as
"shams to forestall unionization and give employees no real voice" '226 has
so colored both labor relations law in the United States, and more partic-
ularly the law embodied in the Wagner Act, that any attempt to trans-
plant European solutions would be difficult, if not impossible.
In the United States the law generally disfavors the use of adminis-
trative or legislative solutions to the problems of employer-employee re-
lations.227 These problems are usually left to the market forces of
relative bargaining power. As a result, "[ihe primary source of rights
and of law in the private-sector organized workplace is the collective bar-
gaining contract. ' 228 Indeed, since World War II, the American courts
have placed a great deal of emphasis on enhancing the enforceability of
the collective bargaining agreement.229
A brief look at some of the history of industrial democracy in the
United States will shed additional light on this matter. Senator Wagner
urged, and Congress adopted in the NLRA, a scheme of industrial de-
mocracy based on concepts of industrial self-government and worker/
owner negotiations, rather than extensive legislative involvement or gov-
ernmental ownership. The NLRA was predicated on notions of majority
rule and organizational unit by organizational unit negotiations rather
than industry-wide or centralized bargaining.23
224. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982); Blackburn, Worker Participation Corporate Directorates.
Is America Ready for Industrial Democracy?, 18 HOUSTON L. REV. 349, 364 (1981) (what
constitutes "junior board"); Summers, supra note 21, at 40 ("With few exceptions the National
Labor Relations Board has found such representation structures [established in place of an
adversarial union] to be unlawful employer-dominated unions." (footnote omitted)).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1982); but see Blackburn, supra note 224, at 366 (discussion
of methods of circumventing these conflicts).
226. Summers, supra note 21, at 41 (footnote omitted); id. at 375-76 (the effect of "com-
pany unions" on the NLRA in 1935).
227. THE POLITICS OF LAW, A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 70-71 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [here-
inafter cited as Kairys]. See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1970).
228. Kairys, supra note 227, at 71.
229. Id.
230. Senator Wagner, the author of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, used
terms reminiscent of Gallatin to justify the requirement that employers recognize and
bargain with the representatives of the majority of their employees: "[D]emocracy in
industry must be based upon the same principles as democracy in government. Ma-
jority rule, with all its imperfections, is the best protection of workers' rights, just as
it is the surest guaranty of political liberty that mankind has yet discovered." Con-
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Under the NLRA, "[tjhe only permissible form of industrial democ-
racy is collective bargaining conceived as an adversarial collective bar-
gaining process. '23 1 Consequently, the rules of industrial relations under
the NLRA require employees to choose either to be represented by a
union which bargains at arms length and on an adversarial basis with the'
employer, or not to be represented at all.232 In short, "[a]ny natural
dichotomy between the interests of employees and management is accen-
tuated by the adversarial roles played by unions and management in the
collective bargaining system established by federal labor legislation in the
United States.' ,233
One additional complicating factor in consideration of transferabil-
ity of European mechanisms is the federal nature of United States gov-
ernment.234 State law controls matters of corporate structure and the
division of powers between shareholders and directors. 35 Since the
worker representative-director provisions of European worker participa-
tion plans would involve, inter alia, reorganization of internal corporate
structures, there are a great many pragmatic problems such proposals
would face.236
Notwithstanding such difficulties in transferability, however, the
gress decided that employee participation in industrial life would take place within a
model of worker-owner negotiations regarding those issues which directly concern
employees: wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore,
these negotiations would take place on a company-by-company basis. Congress then
implicitly rejected large scale governmental regulation of wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment, along with direct governmental or worker ownership.
Unfortunately, the scheme of industrial democracy envisioned by Senator Wagner
has not been realized. Collective bargaining agreements do not cover seventy percent
of the American work force.
Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 66 MINN. L. REv. 383, 396 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
231. Summers, supra note 21, at 41. Cf. id. at 34.
The expectation and promise of the Wagner Act was to make possible for all employ-
ees a system of industrial democracy. Collective bargaining would become the estab-
lished and accepted form of industrial relations. Through collective bargaining
employees would have an effective voice, would be able to protect their own interests,
and would achieve human dignity....
This was the promise of our national labor policy-industrial democracy through
collective bargaining.
Id. Indeed, "the primary purpose [of the NLRA] was to give employees an effective voice,
through collective bargaining, in determining the terms and conditions of theh employment."
Id.
232. Id. at 41.
233. Blackburn, supra note 224, at 364.
234. Marshall, supra note 210, at 448.
235. See N. LATriN, THE LAW OF CORPORATONS 170-200 (2d ed. 1971).
236. A brief discussion of such problems can be found in Blackburn, supra note 224, at
357-58.
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two European examples provide a guide as to just how far the decision-
making process can be subjected to codetermination without infringing
on that "core" of entrepreneurial decision-making power which Western
values of private ownership require that management retain.
VII. A DISTINCTIVELY AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR
WORKER PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES
UNDER THE NLRA
The degree of social and political acceptance of industrial democ-
racy and the general labor relations environment in the United States is
sufficiently distinct from that in West Germany and Sweden to relegate
any statutory restructuring of the participatory mechanisms available in
the United States to the realm of speculation and academic discourse. 237
Moreover, while it is true that Congress could review the NLRA and
urge a broader reading of the appropriate sections (particularly section
8(d)), it is not likely to do so and rewording the statute is unnecessary.
Congressional intent and judicial precedent leave ample room for the
adoption of a more balanced and flexible test in determining just what
constitutes the outer limits of the duty to bargain. Under the terms of
the statute, the courts are free to mold a test which would allow greater
opportunities for workers to participate in a broader range of decisions
affecting their working lives, both through their unions in the collective
bargaining process and through mechanisms provided for in collective
bargaining agreements.
The analysis suggested here is based on United States conceptions of
industrial democracy23 8 and the statutorily declared judgment of Con-
gress that "protection by law of the right of employees to . . bargain
collectively safeguards commerce [and that it is the] policy of the United
States [to] encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
237. Even the use of a statutory restructuring might not allow such mechanisms as works
councils and perhaps even employee representation on a board of directors. Congress at least
theoretically, however, could easily enough adopt an amendment to the NLRA like Section 32
of Sweden's Act on Joint Regulation of Working Life, SFS 1976:580, Joint Regulation Act
§ 32, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, at 239. Such an amendment could provide that
as between parties to a collective bargaining agreement, if the employees so request, there be a
"collective agreement on a right of joint regulation for the employees in matters which concern
the conclusion and termination of contracts of employment, the management and distribution
of the work and the activities of the business in other respects." To be more in line with the
NLRA generally, such an amendment could merely include requests for joint regulation agree-
ments among those subjects of bargaining listed in Section 8(d). Such an amendment would
keep collective agreements at the center of labor relations law, but would still signal a radical
departure from current labor policy.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 227-33.
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ing .... "239 The purposes of the NLRA can be better served, and the
scope of mandatory bargaining under section 8(d) of the Act can be
broadened, without trampling on the concept of managerial prerogative
and the entrepreneur's interest in safeguarding the viability and profit-
ability of his or her enterprise. This can be done by considering worker
and union interests in the balancing of interests which takes place when
considering whether a topic should appropriately be included within the
scope of "terms and conditions of employment," and thereby be deemed
a mandatory subject of bargaining. To do so, however, the test for deter-
mining whether a topic is one which appropriately falls within the ambit
of "terms and conditions of employment," and is, therefore, a mandatory
subject of bargaining, should be modified.
As the Supreme Court has articulated the test in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,24' the "employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking" should be the backdrop against which "bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment" is decided.24 Within this context, bargain-
ing "should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management rela-
tions and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed
on the conduct of the business."'24 This formulation of the test suggests
that the scales are already tipped in the employer's favor even before the
balancing begins.243 Preloading the scale, however, is not necessary. So
long as certain decisions are ultimately left to the managerial discretion
of the owners and a certain degree of unilateral decision-making is re-
served to the shareholders or their representatives, the workers can be a
productive source of input, and their participation will not upset the inci-
239. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
240. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
241. 452 U.S. at 679.
242. Id. It is important to note that the First National Maintenance analysis refers to at
least two groups of decisions: (1) a group of decisions in which the benefits to labor-manage-
ment relations and the collective bargaining process of bargaining are presumptively too atten-
tuated and, therefore, never to be subjected; and (2) another group in which the benefits to
labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process are so great that such topics
are "almost exclusively" within the collective bargaining arena. Id. This fact supports the
contention that while the Court "balances," it has, in these cases, already determined the value
of bargaining about such subjects without the benefit of reviewing the particular fact situations
in which they occur (Le., the scales are tipped by the Court's presumptions about the suitabil-
ity of the topic in general and not by the facts of the case before it).
243. The test presumes the existence of certain employer interests and a hierarchy of em-
ployee interests. One would assume this is done to protect that "core" of interests called
managerial prerogative. See eg., Atleson, supra note 33, at 94-5 (discussing "hidden" judicial
values in this "balancing").
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dents of private ownership.244 The European experience indicates that a
real balancing of interests without a judicial presumption in favor of the
owners would be an appropriate starting point.
If the First National Maintenance balancing test is not cognizant of
worker interests, as is urged here, lower court decisions rendered before
First National Maintenance demonstrate how workers' interests are to be
balanced if they are to be afforded a place in the balancing process. 245
The idea of balancing competing interests under the NLRA in order to
achieve the proper scope for terms of the Act can be seen in a pre-
Fibreboard246 case, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.247 In that case,
the United States Supreme Court, while discussing the scope of negotia-
tions under the Act, stated that "[ihe objectives of national labor policy,
reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and
even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection
to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relation-
ship."248 Cases decided after Fibreboard but before First National Main-
tenance also indicated that an analysis of the competing interests was
necessary in determining whether section 8(d) was appropriate to a par-
ticular situation.24 9 For example, in Ozark Trailers, Inc.,2 0 a case aris-
ing after Fibreboard, the NLRB, citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc., set out
an argument which provides a relatively clear course to the test proposed
below:
[W]e do not believe that the question whether a particular manage-
ment decision must be bargained about should turn on whether the
decision involves the commitment of investment capital, or on whether
it may be characterized as involving "major" or "basic" change in the
nature of the employer's business. . . . An employer's decision to
244. See, eg., Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 734 (3d Cir. 1978) ("both
sides of the controversy, the employer's and the employees', should be seen as crucial, and one
should not be exalted to the exclusion of the other.")
245. Concededly, it is arguable that the workers' interest could have been implicitly consid-
ered in the determination of the benefit to the collective bargaining system. Nevertheless, how
this was done is a matter of pure speculation.
246. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
247. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
248. Id. at 549.
249. See, eg., NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir,
1965) ("in each case the interests of the employees and the purpose of the [Act] ... must be
carefully balanced against the right of an employer. . . ."); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350
F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965) (measuring the limits of the duty by how much it infringes on man.
agement's decision-making). Cf. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). (Although the Court never
uses "balancing" terminology, it discusses the competing interests).
250. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
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make a "major" change in the nature of his business. . . is also of
significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the
termination.
And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of his capital
investment is entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the Act,
so too is the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood."5
The first sentence above rejects any single factor analysis which con-
siders only the interests of the employer, the second asserts the interests
of the workers qua workers and the third urges that the interests of the
workers be truly considered as a competing interest in any balancing test
to determine if a topic of bargaining is mandatory or merely permissive.
In light of this argument, a more appropriate test would interpret
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" broadly. As the U.S.
Supreme Court recently stated:
[T]he 1947 Congress deliberately rejected the Hartley Bill's proposed
restrictions on mandatory bargaining, and instead adopted the phrase
'wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment' from the
Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, in which this language was un-
derstood to be expansive. Indeed, the 1947 history shows that Con-
gress used the phrase 'conditions of employment' to preclude a narrow
construction of the scope of collective bargaining.25
An appropriate balancing test should be expressed essentially as it
was in a case decided by the Third Circuit shortly after Fibreboard:.3
"The words used by Congress in this section are broad and in each case
the interests of the employees and the purpose of the National Labor
Relations Act in securing industrial tranquility2- must be carefully bal-
251. Id. at 566.
252. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488,495-96 (1979) (discussing the LMRA's legis-
lative history); NAT'L LABOR REL BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATONS Acr 313-14, 362, 799, 998, 1050 (1947); Amicus Brief for AFL-CIO and
UAW at 15, First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. 666. See also Order of Railroad Telegra-
phers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 335 (1960) (stating that in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, "Congress made the definition broad because it wanted it to be broad").
It is also arguable that Congress wished the courts to give considerable deference to the
decisions of the experts (Le. the NLRB) in dealing with such matters. See Atleson, supra note
33, at 106 (citing a minority report of the 80th Congress in 1947).
253. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). The endorse-
ment of the RoyalPlating terminology does not necessarily carry with it an endorsement of the
result in that case.
254. I would add the following: "through the process of collective bargaining." See, eg.,
National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) ("encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargainifig. . . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of employment. . . ."). See also Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 734 ("[W]e must con-
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anced against the right of an employer to run his business. '25" This
would explicitly add to the balancing equation such worker interests as
the investment of years of working life, the number of jobs affected and
the employees' accrued economic stake in the enterprise.256 Therefore,
under the test proposed here, the interests of the employer would be bal-
anced against the interests of the workers consistent with the purpose of
the Act: to subject topics of concern to labor and management to the
collective bargaining process.
By balancing all the interests, this test would allow a consideration
of the effects of mandatory bargaining on all of the parties. Unlike the
current test, the harm to both employee participation and managerial
decision-making interests, and not just the limitations on the prerogatives
of managerial direction, would be expressly considered.
The underlying value judgment made by Congress that employers
and their employees should work together to establish mutually satisfac-
tory conditions of employment'through a collective bargaining process
overseen and refereed by the NLRB,257 which is a central element of the
First National Maintenance test, is not disturbed. 258 The proposed test
would open the door to new areas of worker participation by giving the
workers' interests express consideration in the determination of whether
a subject is mandatory or not. Nevertheless, where, in the circumstances
of the particular case, the employer could show grave hardship if bar-
gaining were mandatory, then mandatory bargaining would not be
required.
The European example shows that the point at which the interest of
the workers is outweighed by the need for control of the enterprise by the
owners or shareholders (i.e. the point at which the law should say that
the further expansion of worker participation in control of the enterprise
would interfere with managerial prerogative) can be located. Short of
this point, however, decisions will be codetermined by representatives of
the workers and of the owners.259 Against this backdrop, it is clear that
a balancing of managerial and worker interests within the framework of
collective bargaining negotiations can broaden the range of codetermina-
template the theory of collective bargaining embodied in the NLRA: a commitment to the
efficacy of a framework of discussion and compromise between the parties to labor disputes.").
255. 350 F.2d at 195.
256. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 566.
257. See H.K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
258. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. 666, 674 and n. 11 (citing NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 109-21 and 200-12.
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tion of workplace decisions without treading on those managerial prerog-
atives at the core of private ownership.
VIII. A WORKER PARTICIPATION HYPOTHETICAL
As this Note has demonstrated, the current test for the scope of
"terms and conditions of employment" under section 8(d) of the NLRA,
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in First National
Maintenance, does not adequately consider the interests of the workers
and their union. The post-Fibreboard, pre-First National Maintenance
formulation of the test, which includes the interest of the employees and
their union, the purposes of the NLRA, the collective bargaining process
as a whole and the degree to which such negotiations will hamper the
owners and interfere with their control of the enterprise in deciding
whether particular issues fall within the mandatory bargaining provisions
of the NLRA, seems the fairer test.
In order to illustrate how this test would work, a hypothetical prob-
lem will be subjected to three tests: a West European codetermination
scheme, the current United States Supreme Court "balancing" as repre-
sented by the First National Maintenance decision and the proposed test.
For the purposes of illustration, domestic Company X is a large producer
of goods for a broad international market. The company has several do-
mestic plants and seeks to close one of its facilities and move its machin-
ery to another facility in an area of the country with lower labor costs.
Closure of the plant will inevitably put some, if not all, of the employees
out of work. 6°
A. European System
Under the European schemes,26 this relocation of facilities and the
260. Interestingly, the National Labor Relations Board itself has recently considered the
relocation of work from a union contract-covered facility and the reassignment of work to
nonbargaining unit employees within the same facility. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil
Spring Co., 268 NLRB No. 87 (1984) (popularly known as Milwaukee Spring II). Since the
Board resolved the issue on the basis of whether or not the case involved a contract modifica-
tion (holding that it did not), it left open the issue of whether or not relocation was a
mandatory bargaining subject. Id. at 3-4 n.5, 7, 8. The Board, recognizing the limitations
imposed by First National Maintenance, nonetheless seemed to indicate that in its view, such
relocations could be mandatory topics. See NLRB GC Memorandum 84-4 at 2, 3 and 4 indi-
cating that the "context" of Board's remarks indicates that the majority agree with dissenting
Member Zimmerman that these are "mandatory" topics. See also Milwaukee Spring II, 268
NLRB No. 87 at 11 (citing University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir.
1975)).
261. The primary purpose of using the European mechanism at this point is to illustrate
just how much influence workers can have on a decision which might be entirely excluded
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plant closing would be squarely within the range of topics subject to
codetermination. Under the German Works Council Act of 1972, struc-
tural changes262 must be agreed upon by management and the works
council of the enterprise.263 With regard to such changes it is not suffi-
cient for the employer merely to inform the works council; it must get
the consent of the works council.26 If the parties cannot agree, the Act
provides for mediation by a conciliation board, but ultimately the parties
must reach an agreement;265 absent some kind of extraordinary circum-
stance, management cannot act unilaterally.2 66 In Sweden, the works
council, barring a collective agreement expanding its codetermination
functions, 267 is entitled only to information about, not a voice in, the
matter of relocation.268 Under the Joint Regulation Act, 269 management
would have an additional duty of providing information to the union.
A decision to relocate would probably come before the board of di-
rectors in a Swedish company. Such a decision would come before the
supervisory-board in a German company, but only in the form of a ques-
tion needing ratification after the preliminary decision has been made.
There are some topics which come before the boards in which workers
may not participate. Those topics, however, are primarily related to con-
flict of interest270 and do not include such matters as the relocation and
closing presented in the hypothetical. While the shareholder representa-
from worker participation in this country (under the mandatory subject of bargaining analysis
discussed in this Note) without trampling on that "core" of entrepreneurial interests which
both the Swedish and German systems have sought to protect. In other words, this analysis is
used to provide an "outer limit" against which the proposed and current American tests can be
measured.
262. WORKS COUNCIL AcT, supra note 132, § Il1 at 88. If the question were of the "ef-
fects" alone, however, the parties might lose their right to decide on a conciliation board on
which each would be represented if they cannot agree. Id. at 4 (translator's introduction). See
supra text accompanying notes 139-42 (a relocation or closing is a structural change under the
Act).
263. While the hypothetical leaves the number of employees purposefully vague to allow
freer discussion of possibilities under the legislation in question, for the sake of discussion, the
number of employees involved here is presumed to be sufficient to require a works council. See
supra text accompanying note 134.
264. WORKS COUNCIL AcT, supra note 132, at 2-3 (translator's introduction) (the quoted
language commenting on hiring and firing, but making a comment which is applicable across
the board on decisions covered by the Act). See generally id., passim.
265. See WORKS COUNCIL AcT, supra note 132, § 124 at 108-10.
266. See id. §§ 111-12 at 88-9.
267. Joint Regulation Act, § 32, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 230.
268. Id. at 115-16.
269. Joint Regulation Act § 19, id. app. I at 237. Cf. id. at 116.
270. For the Federal Republic of Germany, see Aktiengesetz 1965 [BGBI] at 1185 § 17; for
Sweden see Board Representation Act, ANGLO-SWEDISH COMP. STUDY, supra note 60, at 148.
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fives have a majority of the votes on these boards, 27" workers could par-
ticipate in the discussion of these matters and could influence the
outcome of the decision-making process.21 2
With respect to collective bargaining, the Swedish example provides
workers with the greater voice. 2 73 German collective bargaining agree-
ments have remained narrow in focus274 and most of the codetermination
functions that would be performed by the local unions in Sweden are
performed by works councils in Germany. Under the Swedish Joint
Regulation Act, however,
[p]arties who enter into a collective agreement on wages and general
conditions of employment should, if the employee side so requests, also
make an agreement 'on a right of joint regulation for the employees in
matters which concern the conclusion and termination of contracts of
employment, the management and distribution of the work, and the
activities of the business in other respects.' 2 "
Therefore, if the union during the course of negotiations over the agree-
ment on wages and other conditions of employment, requests that there
be a joint regulation agreement setting out codetermination rights con-
cerning matters designated by the statute as subjects of such a joint regu-
lation agreement, and any such matter which the union has requested to
be provided for in the agreement is not provided for, the workers retain
"a surviving right to industrial action." 276 They are not bound by the
peace obligation2 77 which attaches to the remainder of the agreement.278
271. Two-thirds of the representatives are shareholder affiliated in smaller German compa-
nies. See supra text accompanying notes 165-72. One-half plus a second vote for the chair
constitute the shareholder majority in larger German companies. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 173-89; see also supra n.159 (as to the nonlabor majority in the Montan sector).
Generally two seats are reserved for workers in Sweden. See supra text accompanying notes
63-68.
272. For a relatively comprehensive discussion of how this works in practice for closely
related topics (ePg., closings and reorganizations) in the codetermination experiences of the
Montan sector in Germany, see J. FURLONG, supra note 4, at 42-58.
273. Many of the same types of agreements called for by the Joint Regulation Act in Swe-
den between union and management are called for by the Works Council Act of 1972 in Ger-
many between works councils and management. Compare text accompanying notes 77-108
with text accompanying notes 132-52. While areas of potential participation are essentially the
same, the mechanisms by which such participation takes place are different-works councils in
Germany and unions in Sweden. See generally Summers, supra note 50.
274. See Summers, supra note 21, at 380.
275. Joint Regulation Act § 32, F. SCMIiT Translation, supra note 59, app. 1 at 239.
276. Joint Regulations Act § 44, id. app. I at 241-42. Cf F. ScHMnIDT, supra note 50, at
147 ("In such a case, therefore, the employer will still retain his powers to make decisions, but
will no longer exercise them with the backing of a peace obligation under the Act.").
277. See Joint Regulations Act §§ 41-5, F. SCHMIDT Translation, supra note 59, app. I at
241-42.
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Therefore, although the employer's freedom of decision is safe-
guarded,27 9 it is not protected by statute (as it would be protected in a
matter falling within the peace obligation) from an industrial action to
pressure it to allow worker participation in the decision. 2a
In Germany, therefore, the decision involved in the hypothetical
would need the consent of the works council, on which only employees
sit, and of the supervisory board, on which the employees have a minor-
ity but strong presence. Management would not only have to justify its
decision to a board of directors on which workers would have a strong
voice, but would also ultimately have to accommodate the workers' rep-
resentatives on the works council at the facility involved unless there
were extraordinary circumstances justifying unilateral action.
Management in Sweden would have to inform the works council
and the union of its decision. It might have to provide them with addi-
tional information as well. The board of directors, with its workers rep-
resentatives, would have an opportunity to review the decision. The
worker voice, however, would be felt primarily in the bargaining arena
where the employees could demand to bargain about the decision. If
management refused, the workers could strike. On the other hand, in
many cases the workers would have bargained for a codetermination
mechanism for resolution of such issues and the fate of the decision to
close the plant and relocate the machinery would depend on the outcome
of the codetermination process.
This discussion has provided an outline of the process within which
the European worker may participate in the major decisions of his or her
enterprise-here, relocation and partial closure. By indicating where
worker input can be overcome by shareholder decision-making power, it
has delineated the "outer limits" beyond which worker influence has not
been permitted to go. On the other hand, by discussing the great degree
of worker input and cooperative decision-making between employer and
employee which can go on under the two systems described here, it has
278. The union could, for example, demand that any decision which would result in a
termination be subjected to works council review of the type present in Germany. See supra
text accompanying notes 133-38. If the parties agreed, the provision would be part of the
agreement. If they failed to agree, the management would be free to make such a decision, but
the union could then engage in industrial action to achieve its codetermination aim since it
raised the issue during negotiations.
279. Unless, in the interest of industrial peace, it has decided to make concessions in these
areas.
280. Recall that some employers could reach collective agreements with unions on a
method of codetermination through a process not discussed above which would still provide
the worker with methods of input. For some interesting suggestions on such agreements see F.
SCHMIDT, supra note 50, at 149.
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also pointed out the opportunities for worker-employer codetermination
which can exist within these limits.
B. Current Test
Under the First National Maintenance standard,"" the decision
would depend on various factors but would probably result in a decision
that the hypothetical topic would probably not be an appropriate subject
for mandatory labor-management bargaining. The burden imposed by
bargaining on the interests of management would be balanced against the
benefits to the "establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to pre-
serve the flow of interstate commerce, '28 2 and the "promotion of collec-
tive bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between
labor and management. '28 3 The outcome of this "balancing" is deter-
mined by asking whether the decision to be negotiated involves a change
in "the scope and direction of the enterprise, is akin to the decision
whether to be in business at all,"' 284 or is "'not in [itself] primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect may be necessarily to termi-
nate employment.' "285 In addition, a court may ask if this is an issue
dealing with an "aspect of the relationship between the employer and the
employees. 28 6
One factor in deciding whether the subject should be made
mandatory is the determination that either the decision is "amenable to
resolution through the bargaining process," and therefore should be sub-
jected to the process, or that it is one in which "[m]anagement must be
free from the constraints of the bargaining process, ' 2 and therefore
should not be subjected to the bargaining process. In Fibreboard, the
Court determined that the matter was "peculiarly suitable for resolution
281. But see Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 493 (11th Cir. 1982), holding
that whether an employer "had a duty to bargain with the Union regarding the decision to
close. . . has been resolved by the Supreme Court," and that "an economic decision to close
part of a business is not a mandatory subject of bargaining under § 8(d) and § 8(aX5) [footnote
omitted]." The analysis here does not deny that the 1lth Circuit's holding is practically true,
but only that the Supreme Court has enumerated a more general test, in the form of balancing,
which has broader implications than a per se rule as to partial closings.
It is important to note at the outset that the Supreme Court has not, to date, passed on the
questions raised in the hypothetical.
282. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 674 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 677.
285. Id. (quoting Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J. concurring)).
286. Id. at 676 (quoting Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 178 (1971)).
287. Id. at 678.
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within the collective bargaining framework. '288 This conclusion, based
on industrial practice and an evaluation of the effect of the decision on
management's freedom to direct the enterprise, seems to mark the line
between those subjects appropriate for mandatory bargaining and those
where employer interest outweighs the interest in subjecting the topic to
the bargaining process.
In the hypothetical case, the interests of the respective parties, while
not identical to those in First National Maintenance,289 are sufficiently
parallel for a court to reach the same holding. Despite the fact that the
decision will have "substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment,"'2 90 the decision is so like the decision to go out of business
or to close part of the operations that the benefits derived from "requir-
ing bargaining over the decision itself ''2 91 will not outweigh the "harm
likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding
whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic rea-
sons." '292 This is because the interests of the employer in "manag[ing] its
affairs unrelated to employment ' 293 (especially if such interests deal with
"capital investments") 294 and in making decisions focusing "only [on]
the economic profitability" of the facility2 95 would probably outweigh the
"incremental benefit [to the process and/or purpose of the Act] that
might be gained through the union's participation in making the
decision."2 96
288. Id. at 680 (quoting Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 214.)
289. See supra text accompanying notes 35-9.
290. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679.
291. Id. at 681.
292. Id. at 686.
293. Id. at 677. This is a reference to its ownership activities which presumptively have too
attenuated a relationship to employment to fall within "terms and conditions of employment,"
Id. at 676-77 (citing Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223).
294. See id. at 680 (quoting Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 214).
295. Id. at 677. The Court has stated that "Congress had no expectation that the elected
union representative would be an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise" and
any efforts to mandate bargaining directed at that area are seen as encroaching on the preroga-
tives of management. Id. at 676-677.
296. Id. at 686. This Note does not endorse this outcome. The Court itself intimated "no
view as to . . .plant relocations. . . ." Id. at 686 n.22. Nevertheless, a move spurred by
"antiunion animus" would be counter to the requirements of the Act and therefore would not
exclude a duty to bargain. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
In addition, despite the fact the employer would not be required to bargain about the
closing and relocation, it would probably be required to bargain about the "effects" of such a
move. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677-678 n.15. See also NLRB v. Royal Plating
& Polishing Co., 350 F.2d at 196.
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C. Proposed Test
Under the proposed test, the evaluation would be much more flexi-
ble.2 97 It would favor, except in unusual or extraordinary circumstances,
subjecting the topic to the collective bargaining process, and if that failed
to yield a satisfactory result, to an economic contest of the parties.293
Under the test proposed, neither side would have any presumptive
interests.299
Management could be required to demonstrate from the factual situ-
ation in question how its interests in the "viability" and "profitability" of
the enterprise would be harmed if it were forced to bargain. Such inter-
ests as whether there was a "major" or "basic" change in the course of
the enterprise or whether there was a need for greater flexibility or se-
crecy to ensure a proper recoupment for the sale of capital goods or the
like could serve as the basis of argument against requiring bargaining300
Workers or their union could demonstrate interests manifested in
their jobs, i e. the number of jobs that could be affected or lost, invest-
ment of years of working life, "acumulat[ed] seniority, accru[ed] pen-
sion rights and. . . skills that may or may not be salable to another
employer. '30 1 The interest in promoting the purposes of the Act would
point to subjecting the topic to the collective bargaining process since
"[d]irect negotiations by the disputants is viewed as helpful both to the
nation, which thereby can be spared to some extent the disruptive prod-
ucts of a lack of communication between labor and management, and to
the participants themselves, who thereby are put in a position of listening
to the other side and understanding, if not agreeing, with [sic] the oppos-
ing view.' , 3 1 If the topic were situationally unsuitable for the collective
bargaining process (as would be the case if utmost secrecy were required
to prevent discovery by competitors of the sale of a division) or its incre-
mental benefit were either nonexistent or very small, even this interest
297. The issue of "animus" and bargaining over "effects" would not be disturbed by the
new test and, therefore, is not discussed in this Note.
298. An obligation to confer or bargain in good faith is not the same as a compulsion to
agree, and ultimately such decisions would rest with the employer. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 32-34.
299. Cf Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 734 (one side's interests "should not be ex-
alted to the exclusion of the other."). See also Atleson, supra note 31, at 107 (stating his view
that the First National Maintenance test does not require that any of the employer's presump-
tive interests actually be present).
300. See, eg., First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679-80; Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. at 566. Cf. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d at 194-97 (discussing
a facility closing).
301. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 1161 N.L.R.B. at 566.
302. Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 734.
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would not necessarily mean subjecting the topic to mandatory
bargaining.30 3
Unlike the result under the current test, the result under the pro-
posed test would not "turn on whether the decision involves the commit-
ment of investment capital, or on whether it may be characterized as
involving 'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's busi-
ness." 3" Nor will the decision turn solely on factors as abstract as those
in the First National Maintenance test.30 5 It is true that considerations of
the benefit to the collective bargaining system as a whole, particularly in
light of the language of Section 1 of the NLRA "encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of. . .designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection, ' 30 6 and the degree
to which a decision infringes on owners' rights "independently to rear-
range [their] businesses, '307 will be factors. Additionally, however, the
proposed test allows for and, since it has no predetermined outcome, en-
courages the parties to articulate situational and specific (as opposed to
policy-oriented) reasons for or against subjecting the particular topic to
bargaining. The owners, in order to avoid an NLRB remedial order to
bargain in good faith, would be required to show the economic necessity
of the relocation and the need for expediency in the actual situation at
hand.308 Such needs would not be judicially or administratively as-
sumed.30 9 The workers would likewise be required to produce practical
considerations underlying their interests in order to provide the basis for
the NLRB to issue a bargaining order against an unwilling employer. 310
Thus, the workers could show their accumulated pensions, years of ser-
vice and other economic interests, and the effect of the company's leaving
on their community.31' Conversely, the company could show its actual
303. Cf First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 680-81 (discussing the purposes of the
Act).
304. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 566.
305. See, e.g., Atleson, supra note 33, at 99 (discussing the Fibreboard concurrence), 102-03
(discussing United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) and 107-08 (dis.
cussing First National Maintenance).
306. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
307. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 549.
308. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682-83. See also supra text accompanying
note 295.
309. Atleson, supra note 33, at 107.
310. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 566.
311. This is exactly what the administrative law judge in United Steelworkers v. United
States Steel Corp., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2925 (N.D. Ohio 1980) could not do.
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economic harm if forced to negotiate. Since presumably the interests of
each party in the situation presented in the hypothetical are, to that
party, quite significant, the balance would be determined by the effect on
the purposes of the NLRA of requiring collective bargaining on this
topic.
If the philosophy behind First National Maintenance prevailed the
presumed disadvantages to the employer would be weighed against the
"incremental benefit" to the collective bargaining process gained by sub-
jecting this decision to collective bargaining312 and the balance would be
tipped in the employer's favor. In contrast, the proposed test would rely
on the fact that "[t]he theory of the Act is that free opportunity for nego-
tiation with the accredited representatives of employees is likely to pro-
mote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.1 313 It
would hold that the subjects of mandatory bargaining should be flexi-
ble314 and should be decided on a case-by-case basis with the opportunity
for sharing of information and perspectives entailed by bargaining as a
backdrop against which the decision should be made.315 In the situation
under discussion here, particularly since the parties will probably already
be discussing the "effects" 3 6 of the proposed change, the opportunity for
negotiations on a matter of such grave concern to employer and em-
ployee would not meet the unusual circumstance requirement (eg., se-
crecy) under which a topic is peculiarly unsuitable for the bargaining
process. 317
The topics included in this hypothetical would fall within the scope
of mandatory bargaining under the proposed test unless peculiarities of
the situation or the actual urgency of the employer's interests in this fac-
312. See supra text accompanying notes 289-96.
313. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at45 (cited inFirstNationalMainte-
nance, 452 U.S. at 678 n.16).
314. Contrast this with First National Maintenance, 425 U.S. at 684:
While evidence of current labor practice is only an indication of what is feasible
through collective bargaining, and not a binding guide [citation omitted]... that
evidence supports the apparent imbalance weighing against mandatory bargaining.
We note that provisions giving unions a right to participate in the decision making
process concerning the alteration of the scope of an enterprise appear to be relatively
rare.
315. See e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks, 582 F.2d at 734 ("Direct negotiations by the dispu-
tants are viewed as helpful.. . to the nation.. . .") See also NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
316. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677, n.15. See supra note 286.
317. Discussion of the underlying decision, as well as its effects has been viewed, at least at
one time, as a positive experience by the NLRB. Cf Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.LR.B. at 570
(on constr.ction of the duty to bargain and the helpfulness of discussing the decision and its
effects).
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tual situation outweighed the quite substantial interests of the employees
and their union. Since no such exceptional circumstances were men-
tioned in the hypothetical, the parties would be required to bargain
about, but not necessarily to agree on, a decision to relocate and close the
existing facility.s'
D. Summary
The purpose of this hypothetical was to test whether an issue of
great interest to management and workers, and not incidentally, one
about which First National Maintenance would probably not require bar-
gaining, could be subjected to participatory processes without infringing
on managerial prerogative. The European systems represent expansive
uses of participatory mechanisms to resolve such questions. Both the
German and Swedish systems recognize that there exists a point beyond
which ownership rights of the shareholders would be infringed. Under
these systems, the topic in the hypothetical was perfectly appropriate for
such processes. Unlike the decision under the First National Mainte-
nance standard, the proposed test would yield the result that, save in
circumstances in which the need for secrecy or speed on the part of man-
agement were manifest, the topic would be ripe for mandatory collective
bargaining. Despite this fact, the proposed test would not, as the Euro-
pean systems would not, require employer-employee agreement. It
would merely determine whether a topic were suitable for worker input
and, if so, subject it to a type of process in which management's ultimate
power to reject worker ideas and to unilaterally make the decision is safe-
guarded. In short, the proposed test would not go farther than the Euro-
pean mechanisms in allowing worker codetermination of decisions with
great impact on workers and management. Indeed, it does not afford as
much room for participation since it merely requires good faith bargain-
ing rather than agreement or consent, and only through the mechanism
of collective agreement negotiation. In this way, it does not in any real
sense infringe on truly managerial prerogatives.
318. Recall that:
[t]he employer has no obligation to abandon its intentions or to agree with union
proposals. On proper subjects, it must meet with the union, provide information
necessary to the union's understanding of the problem, and in good faith consider
any proposals the union advances. In concluding to reject a union's position as to a
mandatory subject, however, it must face the union's possible use of strike power.
[citation omitted].
First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 678-79 n. 17. See also HK. Porter Co., 397 U.S. 99
(1970).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Discussing trends in the labor relations arena and comparative legal
analysis are both risk-filled undertakings. This Note has attempted both
of these tasks in order to give some perspective to the process by which
the NLRB and United States federal courts tell the parties to a collective
bargaining negotiation that they cannot use their relative economic
power to reach agreements over "matter[s] of central and pressing con-
cern to the union," '319 particularly matters of job security. The test used
by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a topic is
mandatory or permissive "is surely an odd one. Only one side of the
balance is considered, and the interests conceivably involved do not have
to actually be present."32 The worker participation programs estab-
lished under statutory authority in Sweden and West Germany, while
admittedly not capable of complete transfer to the United States in their
extant forms, deal with these same concerns. They resolve issues of man-
agerial control and prerogatives with considerable deference to the
codetermination mechanisms in place while leaving (extraordinary) re-
course to shareholders or the owner-representatives who compose the
majority of the board of directors in case the process of joint determina-
tion does not yield a satisfactory solution. These programs shed some
light on the degree to which a codetermination process can function
without infringing on that "core" of entrepreneurial prerogatives which
Western nations believe to be essential to the viability of corporate
enterprises.
This Note presented a hypothetical situation with worker participa-
tion implications and three resolutions were discussed (one each for the
European, the First National Maintenance and the proposed tests). The
results of that discussion demonstrated that the proposed test would not
go as far as the European mechanisms for worker participation. This
was done to prove that this proposed test, a test with roots in United
States case law prior to the First National Maintenance decision, and a
test which is more sympathetic to the interests and desires of the work-
ers, need not reach the point of infringing on truly managerial preroga-
tives. This test not only gives appropriate attention to the interests of the
managers and owners, but it uses a true balancing of interests: the inter-
est of the workers and their union, the benefits to the labor-management
319. First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677.
320. Atleson, supra note 33, at 107. See also First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 689
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree with this test, because it... fails to consider the
legitimate employment interests of the workers and their union.").
19841
144 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 8
relations environment and collective bargaining process gained by sub-
jecting a topic to mandatory bargaining, and the interest of the manage-
ment and owners in running a profitable business and safeguarding the
viability of the entity.
The Western European experience provides a guide as to where the
line between appropriate and inappropriate subjects for codetermination
can be drawn with an eye toward industrial democracy and without in-
fringing on the rights of the managers and owners of the enterprise.
Therefore, if United States courts wish to honor the legislative intent of
Congress to afford broad scope to the subjects of collective bargaining
and to protect the interests of all the parties (workers as well as owners)
without infringing on management's "need" for some prerogatives in the
appropriate circumstances, and if they wish to honor the values of the
NLRA in promoting worker participation in the decisions of manage-
ment which affect working life, the courts should adopt the more flexible
test advocated herein.
